“Defensive war,” says Napoleon, “does not preclude attack, any more than offensive war is exclusive of defence,” for frequently the best way to counteract the enemy’s operations, and prevent his conquests, is, at the very outset of the war, to invade and cripple him.  But this can never be attempted with raw troops, ill supplied with the munitions of war, and unsupported by fortifications.  Such invasions must necessarily fail.  Experience in the wars of the French revolution has demonstrated this; and even our own short history is not without its proof.  In 1812, the conquest of Canada was determined on some time before the declaration of war; an undisciplined army, without preparation or apparent plan, was actually put in motion, eighteen days previous to this declaration, for the Canadian peninsula.  With a disciplined army of the same numbers, with an efficient and skilful leader, directed against the vital point of the British possessions at a time when the whole military force of the provinces did not exceed three thousand men, how different had been the result!

While, therefore, the permanent defences of a nation must be subordinate to its resources, position, and character, they can in no case be dispensed with.  No matter how extensive or important the temporary means that may be developed as necessity requires, there must be some force kept in a constant state of efficiency, in order to impart life and stability to the system.  The one can never properly replace the other; for while the former constitutes the basis, the latter must form the main body of the military edifice, which, by its strength and durability, will offer shelter and protection to the nation; or, if the architecture and materials be defective, crush and destroy it in its fall.

The permanent means of military defence employed by modern nations, are—­

1st.  An army; 2d.  A navy; 3d.  Fortifications.

The first two of these could hardly be called permanent, if we were, to regard their personnel; but looking upon them as institutions or organizations, they present all the characteristics of durability.  They are sometimes subjected to very great and radical changes; by the hot-house nursing of designing ambition or rash legislation, they may become overgrown and dangerous, or the storms of popular delusion may overthrow and apparently sweep them away.  But they will immediately spring up again in some form or other, so deeply are they rooted in the organization of political institutions.

Its army and navy should always be kept within the limits of a nation’s wants; but pity for the country which reduces them in number or support so as to degrade their character or endanger their organization.  “A government,” says one of the best historians of the age, “which neglects its army, under whatever pretext, is a government culpable in the eyes of posterity, for it is preparing humiliations for its flag and its country, instead of laying the foundation for its glory.”