The moral duty of nations in this respect is the same as that of individuals.  Active benevolence and forbearance should be employed, so far as may be proper; but there are points at which forbearance ceases to be a virtue.  If we entirely forbear to punish the thief, the robber, and the murderer, think you that crime will be diminished?  Reason and experience prove the contrary.  Active benevolence and kindness should always attend just punishment, but they were never designed to prohibit it.  The laws of God’s universe are founded on justice as well as love.  “The moral sentiment of every community rises in opposition to injury inflicted upon the just, the kind, and the merciful;” but this fact does not entirely prevent wicked men from robbing and murdering innocent persons, and therefore wise and just laws require that criminals shall be punished, in order that those who are dead to all moral restraints may be deterred from crime through fear of punishment.

“2d.  But suppose the [national] injury to be done.  I reply, the proper appeal for moral beings, upon moral questions, is not to physical force, but to the consciences of men.  Let the wrong be set forth, but be set forth in the spirit of love; and in this manner, if in any, will the consciences of men be aroused to justice.”

Argument, and “appeals to the consciences of men” should always be resorted to in preference to “physical force;” but when they fail to deter the wicked, force must be employed.  I may reason with the robber and the murderer, to persuade him to desist from his attempt to rob my house, and murder my family; but if he refuse to listen to moral appeals, I employ physical force,—­I call in the strong arm of the law to assist me; and if no other means can be found to save innocent life that is assailed, the life of the assailant must be sacrificed.

“If,” says Puffendorf, “some one treads the laws of peace under his feet, forming projects which tend to my ruin, he could not, without the highest degree of impudence, (impudentissime,) pretend that after this I should consider him as a sacred person, who ought not to be touched; in other words, that I should betray myself, and abandon the care of my own preservation, in order to give way to the malice of a criminal, that he may act with impunity and with full liberty.  On the contrary, since he shows himself unsociable towards me, and since he has placed himself in a position which does not permit me safely to practice towards him the duties of peace, I have only to think of preventing the danger which menaces me; so that if I cannot do this without hurting him, he has to accuse himself only, since he has reduced me to this necessity.” De Jure Nat. et Gent, lib. ii., ch. v., Sec.1.  This same course of reasoning is also applied to the duties of a nation towards its enemy in respect to war.

“3d.  But suppose this method fail.  Why, then, let us suffer the evil.”