lines of the Oder, the Elbe, and the Weser, had they been properly repaired, garrisoned, and defended, were sufficient to have held in check the French, even after the great victory of Jena, till the newly-organized forces, acting in concert with the Russian army, could re-establish the Prussian monarchy in its ancient greatness.  Profiting by the neglect of the Prussians, Napoleon seized upon the great defensive works of the country, which, to his great joy, were readily surrendered into his hands by the old and inefficient generals who commanded them; and French garrisons were almost immediately established in the fortresses of Stettin, Custrin, Glogau, Magdeburg, Spandau, Hameln, Nieubourg, &c.  “Spandau,” said he in the 19th Bulletin, “is an inestimable acquisition.  In our hands it could sustain two months of operations.  But such was the general confusion, that the Prussians had not even armed its batteries.”  The possession of these fortifications inclined the scale at Eylau.  All the historians of the war notice their influence on the campaigns of Friedland and Tilsit.

These Prussian fortresses were retained by Napoleon at the treaty of Tilsit.  The campaign of 1809 proved the wisdom of this policy, as they effectually prevented Prussia from joining Austria in rekindling the flames of war.  And again in 1813, these works might have produced a decided influence on the campaign, had not the political perfidy of Austria, and the treason of the French generals, prevented Napoleon from profiting by the advantages of his position.

The influence of the fortifications of Spain upon the Peninsular campaigns has often been alluded to by historians.  Those works which had been given up to Napoleon previous to the opening of hostilities, contributed very much to the success of his arms; while those which had been retained by Spain and her allies contributed in an equal degree to fetter and embarrass his operations.  Some of these, like Saragossa, Tarragona, Gerona, Tortosa, &c. &c., with their broken walls and defective armaments, kept the enemy in check for months; and, by compelling the French to resort to the tedious operations of sieges, did much to weaken the French power in the Peninsula.

The influence of the fortifications of the French frontiers in furnishing a secure basis for the successful operations of Napoleon into the enemy’s territory, has already been noticed.  If these fortresses of France, after the disasters of 1812 and ’13, failed to save the nation, the cause must be sought for in the peculiar features of the invasion itself, rather than any lack of military influence in the French defences.  As has been already remarked, a million of disciplined men, under consummate leaders, were here assailing a single state, impoverished by the fatal war in Russia,—­torn in pieces by political factions,—­deserted by its sworn allies,—­its fortresses basely betrayed into the enemy’s hands, and its military power paralyzed by the treason of generals with their entire armies.  Its only hope was in the fortresses which had remained faithful; and Napoleon said at St. Helena, that if he had collected together the garrisons of these few fortresses and retired to the Rhine, he could have crushed the allies even after their entrance into Paris.  But political considerations prevented the operation.