a sap-roller was placed in position—­some thirty guns would be brought to bear upon it, the result being its immediate destruction.  It may justly be said of the French approaches, that they admirably carried into practice their system of sapping.  The technical skill and patient courage evinced by their officers and men in pushing forward such excellent approaches, under a most deadly fire, is worthy of all commendation, and is such as might have been expected from the antecedents of their corps of engineers.”

“With regard to the English, the case was different; it seemed as if they systematically abandoned the excellent system taught and perfected with so much care at Chatham.  Whenever the ground was difficult, their trenches generally ceased to afford shelter; a shallow excavation in the rock, and a few stones thrown up in front, appeared to be all that was considered necessary in such cases.  They were often faulty in direction as well as in profile, being not unfrequently badly defiladed, or not gaining ground enough and entirely too cramped; nor were they pushed as close to the Redan as they ought to have been before giving the assault.  In too many cases the expression ’tatonnement of the French would seem to convey the best idea of their operations.  Their batteries, however, were very well constructed.  The magazines, platforms, etc., were
 usually similar to those adopted at Chatham, although
unnecessary deviations were sometimes complained of.  They employed neither armor nor the full sap, sometimes the half-full, but generally the flying-sap were employed.”

It may also be added, that, at the time of the assault, the French approaches had been pushed to the distance of thirty-two paces of the counterscarp of the Malakoff, while the English had scarcely reached within two hundred and twenty-five yards of the ditch of the Redan.

This description of the operations of the English at the siege of Sebastopol carries the professional reader directly back to their sieges in the Spanish Peninsula.  It certainly is very strange that a great nation leading the van of civilization should, after such experience, have neglected to provide its army with a proper number of engineer officers and engineer troops, well instructed in the peculiar and difficult duties of that arm.  What excuse can ever be offered for substituting human life for professional skill in the operations of a siege, when that skill may so readily be acquired in time of peace, and is always so necessary an element of a good military organization!

While every one admits that the siege of Sebastopol proved the immense importance of fieldworks against land attacks, some would conclude from the operations of that siege that good earthen works of a large development are better suited for the defence of a large city than permanent fortifications with masonry revetments, and which will necessarily have a less extended line of fire and less capacity for men and military stores.  We quote the remarks of Captain McClelland on this point, and also make a short extract from the recently published Journal of the siege of Sebastopol by General Niel.