The French, in this campaign, had relinquished all idea of opposing the enemy in the open field, and confined their efforts to retard the advance of the English till France could send troops to their relief; but no such relief came, and when the campaign of 1760 opened, the little French army was concentrated at Montreal.  As the English divisions advanced, one by Oswego, one by Lake Champlain, and the third by Quebec, they afforded to the French a fine opportunity for the strategic movement from a centre against converging lines; but the garrison was too weak to hope for success in either direction, and therefore awaited the enemy within their works.  Montreal, being but slightly fortified, was soon reduced, and with it fell the French empire erected in this country at infinite labor and expense.

At the first outbreak of the American Revolution, it was so obviously important to get possession of the military works commanding the line of Lake Champlain, that expeditions for this purpose were simultaneously fitted out by Massachusetts and Connecticut.  The garrisons of these works were taken by surprise.  This conquest, says Botta, the able and elegant historian of the Revolution, “was no doubt of high importance, but it would have had a much greater influence upon the course of the whole war, if these fortresses, which are the bulwarks of the colonies, had been defended in times following, with the same prudence and valor with which they had been acquired.”

In the campaign of 1775, an army of two thousand seven hundred and eighty-four effective men, with a reserve of one thousand at Albany, crossed the lake and approached the fortress of St. John’s about the 1st of September.  The work was garrisoned by only about five or six hundred regulars, and some two hundred militia.  This was the only obstacle to prevent the advance of our army into the very heart of Canada; to leave it unreduced in rear would cut off all hope of retreat.  Allen had already made the rash and foolish attempt, and his whole army had been destroyed, and he himself made prisoner.  The reduction of this place was therefore deemed absolutely necessary, but was not effected till the 3d of November, and after a long and tedious siege.  This delay decided the fate of the campaign; for, although Montreal fell immediately afterwards, the season was so far advanced that a large portion of our troops, wearied with their sufferings from cold and want of clothing, now demanded their discharge.  The eastern division, of one thousand men under Arnold, crossing the country by the Kennebeck and Chaudiere, through difficulties and suffering almost unparalleled, arrived opposite Quebec on the 9th of November.  The place was at this time almost without defence, and, had Arnold possessed a suitable pontoon equipage, it might easily have been taken by surprise.  But by the time that the means for effecting a passage could be prepared, and a junction could be effected between the two American armies, Quebec was prepared to sustain their attack.  The result of that attack is too well known to require a repetition here.