of one million of souls, while that of both Canada and Louisiana did not exceed fifty-two thousand.  But the French possessions, though situated at the extremities of a continent and separated by an almost boundless wilderness, were nevertheless connected by a line of military posts, strong enough to resist the small arms that could then be brought against them.  This fort-building propensity of the French became a matter of serious alarm to the colonies, and in 1710 the legislature of New York especially protested against it in an address to the crown.  While the military art was stationary in England, France had produced her four great engineers—­Errard, Pagan, Vauban, and Cormontaigne; and nowhere has the influence of their system of military defence been more strikingly exhibited than in the security it afforded to the Canadian colony, when assailed by such vastly superior British forces.  Still further accessions were now made to these English forces by large reinforcements from the mother country, while the Canadians received little or no assistance from France; nevertheless they prolonged the war till 1760, forcing the English to adopt at last the slow and expensive process of reducing all their fortifications.  This will be shown in the following outline of the several campaigns.

Very early in 1755, a considerable body of men was sent from Great Britain to reinforce their troops in this country.  These troops were again separated into four distinct armies.  The first, consisting of near two thousand men, marched to the attack of Fort Du Quesne, but was met and totally defeated by one-half that number of French and Indians.  The second division, of fifteen hundred, proceeded to attack Fort Niagara by way of Oswego, but returned without success.  The third, of three thousand seven hundred men, met and defeated Dieskau’s army of twelve hundred regulars and six hundred Canadians and Indians, in the open field, but did not attempt to drive him from his works at Ticonderoga and Crown Point.  The fourth, consisting of three thousand three hundred men and forty-one vessels, laid waste a portion of Nova Scotia; thus ending the campaign without a single important result.  It was commenced under favorable auspices, with ample preparations, and a vast superiority of force; but this superiority was again more than counterbalanced by the faulty plans of the English, and by the fortifications which the French had erected, in such positions as to give them a decided advantage in their military operations. Washington early recommended the same system of defence for the English on the Ohio; and, after Braddock’s defeat, advised “the erection of small fortresses at convenient places to deposit provisions in, by which means the country will be eased of an immense expense in the carriage, and it will also be a means of securing a retreat if we should be put to the rout again.”