But we will suppose that there are no such points of land, in the inlets to our harbors, and that we rely for defence upon a naval force exclusively.  Let us leave out of consideration the security of all our other harbors and our commerce on the high seas, and also the importance of having at command the means of attacking the enemy’s coast, in the absence of his fleet.  We take the single case of the attack being made on New York harbor, and that our whole fleet is assembled there.  Now, if this fleet be equal in number to the enemy, the chances of success may be regarded as equal; if inferior, the chances are against us—­for an attacking force would probably be of picked men and of the best materials.  But here the consequences of victory are very unequal:  the enemy can lose his squadron only, while we put in peril both our squadron and the objects it is intended to defend.  If we suppose our own naval force superior to that of the enemy, the defence of this harbor would in all respects be complete, provided this force never left the harbor.  But, then, all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must be left to its fate; and no attempt can be made to react offensively upon the foe, unless we can control the chances of finding the enemy’s fleets within his ports, and the still more uncertain chance of keeping him there; the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor.

These remarks are based upon the supposition that we have but the single harbor of New York; whereas Portland, Portsmouth, Boston, Newport, the Delaware, the Chesapeake, Charleston, Savannah, Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans, and numerous other places, are equally open to attack, and therefore must be equally defended, for we know not to which the enemy will direct his assaults.  If he come to one of these in the absence of our fleet, his object is attained without resistance; or, if his whole force be concentrated upon one but feebly defended, we involve both fleet and harbor in inevitable ruin.  Could our fleet be so arranged as to meet these enterprises?

“As it cannot be denied that the enemy can select the point of attack out of the whole extent of coast, where is the prescience that can indicate the spot?  And if it cannot be foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted that shall always place our fleet in the path of the advancing foe?  Suppose we attempt to cover the coast by cruising in front of it, shall we sweep its whole length—­a distance scarcely less than that which the enemy must traverse in passing from his coast to ours?  Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept, as well as the Atlantic; or shall we give up the Gulf to the enemy?  Shall we cover the southern cities, or give them up also?  We must unquestionably do one of two things—­either relinquish a great extent of coast, confining our cruisers to a small portion only, or include so much that the chances of intercepting an enemy would seem to be out of the question.”