Such was the effect produced on the British fleet, sailing with a favorable wind and strong current past the half-armed and half-manned forts of the Dardanelles.  Duckforth himself says, that “had he remained before Constantinople much longer—­till the forts had been completely put in order—­no return would have been open to him, and the unavoidable sacrifice of the squadron must have been the consequence.”  Scarcely had the fleet cleared the Straits, before it (the fleet) was reinforced with eight sail of the line; but, even with this vast increase of strength, the English did not venture to renew the contest.  They had effected a most fortunate escape.  General Jomini says that if the defence had been conducted by a more enterprising and experienced people, the expedition would have cost the English their whole squadron.

Great as was the damage done to the fleet, the forts themselves were uninjured.  The English say their own fire did no execution, the shot in all probability not even striking their objects—­“the rapid change of position, occasioned by a fair wind and current, preventing the certainty of aim.”  The state of the batteries when the fleet first passed, is thus described in James’s Naval History:  “Some of them were dilapidated, and others but partially mounted and poorly manned.”  And Alison says:  “They had been allowed to fall into disrepair.  The castles of Europe and Asia, indeed, stood in frowning majesty, to assert the dominion of the Crescent at the narrowest part of the passage, but their ramparts were antiquated, their guns in part dismounted, and such as remained, though of enormous calibre, little calculated to answer the rapidity and precision of an English broadside.”

Much has been said because the fortifications of the Dardanelles did not hermetically seal that channel, (an object they were never expected to accomplish, even had they been well armed and well served;) but it is forgotten, or entirely overlooked, that twelve Turkish line-of-battle -ships, two of them three-deckers, with nine frigates, were with their sails bent and in apparent readiness, filled with troops, and lying within the line of fortifications; and yet this naval force effected little or nothing against the invaders. It is scarcely ever mentioned, being regarded of little consequence as a means of defence; and yet the number of its guns and the expense of its construction and support, could hardly have fallen short of the incomplete and half-armed forts, some of which were as ancient as the reign of Amurath!

Algiers.—­The following narrative of the attack on Algiers, in 1816, is drawn from the reports of the English and Dutch admirals, and other official and authentic English papers.