In 1815, a squadron of British ships, stationed off the mouths of the Mississippi, for the purpose of a blockade, ascended the river as high as Fort St. Philip, which is a small work capable of an armament of only twenty guns in all.  A heavy fire of shot and shells was continued with but few and short pauses for nine days and nights, but making no impression either on the fort or garrison, they retreated to their former position at the mouth of the river.

There is but a single instance in the war of 1812, where the enemy’s vessels succeeded in reducing a fort; and this has sometimes been alluded to, by persons ignorant of the real facts of the case, as a proof against the ability of our fortifications to resist naval attacks.  Even if it were a case of decided failure, would this single exception be sufficient to overthrow the weight of evidence on the other side?  We allude to the reduction of the so-called Fort Washington by the British fleet that ascended the Potomac in 1814, to assist in the disgraceful and barbarous operation of burning the capitol and destroying the archives of the nation.  Fort Washington was a very small and inefficient work, incorrectly planned by an incompetent French engineer; only a small part of the fort was then built, and it has not yet been completed.  The portion constructed was never, until very recently, properly prepared for receiving its armament, and at the time of attack could not possibly have held out a long time.  But no defence whatever was made.  Capt.  Gordon, with a squadron of eight sail, carrying one hundred and seventy-three guns, under orders “to ascend the river as high as Fort Washington, and try upon it the experiment of a bombardment,” approached that fort, and, upon firing a single shell, which did no injury to either the fort or the garrison, the latter deserted the works, and rapidly retreated.  The commanding officer was immediately dismissed for his cowardice.  An English naval officer, who was one of the expedition, in speaking of the retreat of the garrison, says:  “We were at loss to account for such an extraordinary step.  The position was good and the capture would have cost us at least fifty men, and more, had it been properly defended; besides, an unfavorable wind and many other chances were in their favor,” &c.  The fleet ascended the river to Alexandria, but learning soon afterwards that batteries were preparing at White House and Indian Head to cut off its retreat, it retired, in much haste, but not without injury.

Some have also pretended to find in modern European history a few examples contradictory of the relative power which we have here assigned to ships and forts.  Overlooking the numerous and well-authenticated examples, where forts of small dimensions and of small armament have repelled large fleets, they would draw their conclusions from the four or five instances where fleets have gained (as was at first supposed) a somewhat doubtful victory over forts.  But a careful and critical examination of the facts in these cases, will show that even these are no exceptions to the general rule of the superiority of guns ashore over guns afloat.