We are told that the three classes of our population demanding unrestricted immigration are large employers of unskilled labor, transportation companies, and revolutionary anarchists.  Since this is by definition an economic and not a philosophical question, we may neglect the third class.  To the other two classes should be directed certain brief tests of economic good faith.  Take at its face value their claim that European brawn by the ship-load is indispensable to American industry.  It is becoming an accepted maxim that industry should bear its own charges, should pay its own way.  American industry has long fought the contract-labor exclusion feature in current immigration law.  Suppose we frankly admit that it is much better for the immigrant to come over here to a definite job than to wander about for weeks after he arrives, a prey to immigrant banks, fake employment agents, and other sharks.  Suppose, accordingly, we repeal the laws against contract-labor.  Let the employer contract for as many foreign laborers as he likes or says he needs.  But make the contractor liable for support and deportation costs if the laborers become public charges.  Also require him to assume the cost of unemployment insurance.  Exact a bond for the faithful performance of these terms, guaranteed in somewhat the same way that National Banks are safeguarded.  Immigration authorities now commonly require a bond from the relatives of admitted aliens who seem likely to become public charges, but who are allowed to enter with the benefit of the doubt.  Customs and revenue rules admit dutiable goods in bond.  Hence the principle of the bond is perfectly familiar, and its application to contract-immigrants would be in no sense an untried or dangerous experiment.  It would establish no new precedent:  for precedents, and successful ones, are already established, accepted and approved.  It would be understood that all admissions of aliens can be only provisional, with no time limit on deportation.  It would be understood further—­and the plan would work automatically if the contractor were made such a deeply interested party—­that intending immigrants must be rigidly inspected, that they be required to produce consular certificates of clean police record, freedom from chronic disease, insanity, etc.

The result of such a scheme would probably cut away entirely contract-labor; for it would not longer pay.  But this does not mean barring the gate to all foreign labor.  As an aid to the employer and to our own native workingman, we must, sooner or later, and the sooner the better, establish a chain of labor bureaus throughout the Union.  The system must be placed under Federal direction, largely because the Department of Labor would be charged, ex officio, with ascertaining the “true demand” for immigrant labor, and it could only accomplish this end effectively through such an employment clearing system.  This true demand would, of course, be based not only upon mere numerical excess of calls for labor over demands for jobs, but would also take into account the nature of the work, working conditions, and above all the prevailing level of wages.  According to this true demand the Department would adjust a sliding scale of admissions of immigrant laborers.