bottles.  The system is not ’all of one piece’—­distinctly not.  There are places where the rent is certainly made worse by the old cloth on the new garment.  The work taken as a whole is so bewildering that one finds himself asking, ’What is Ritschl’s method?’ If what is meant is not a question of detail, but of the total apprehension of the problem to be solved, the apprehension which we strove to outline above, then Ritschl’s courageous and complete inversion of the ancient method, his demand that we proceed from the known to the unknown, is a contribution so great that all shortcomings in the execution of it are insignificant.  His first volume deals with the history of the doctrine of justification, beginning with Anselm and Abelard.  In it Ritschl’s eminent qualities as historian come out.  In it also his prejudices have their play.  The second volume deals with the Biblical foundations for the doctrine.  Ritschl was bred in the Tuebingen school.  Yet here is much forced exegesis.  Ritschl’s positivistic view of the Scripture and of the whole question of revelation, was not congruous with his well-learned biblical criticism.  The third volume is the constructive one.  It is of immeasurably greater value than the other two.  It is this third volume which has frequently been translated.

In respect of his contention against metaphysics it is hardly necessary that we should go into detail.  With his empirical and psychological point of departure, given above, most men will find themselves in entire sympathy.  The confusion of religion, which is an experience, with dogma which is reasoning about it, and the acceptance of statements in Scripture which are metaphysical in nature, as if they were religious truths—­these two things have, in time past, prevented many earnest thinkers from following the true road.  When it comes to the constructive portion of his work, it is, of course, impossible for Ritschl to build without the theoretical supports which philosophy gives, or to follow up certain of the characteristic magnitudes of religion without following them into the realm of metaphysics, to which, quite as truly as to that of religion, they belong.  It would be unjust to Ritschl to suppose that these facts were hidden from him.

As to his attitude toward mysticism, there is a word to say.  In the long history of religious thought those who have revolted against metaphysical interpretation, orthodox or unorthodox, have usually taken refuge in mysticism.  Hither the prophet Augustine takes refuge when he would flee the ecclesiastic Augustine, himself.  The Brethren of the Free Spirit, Tauler, a Kempis, Suso, the author of the Theologia Germanica, Molinos, Madame Gayon, illustrate the thing we mean.  Ritschl had seen much of mysticism in pietist circles.  He knew the history of the movement well.  What impressed his sane mind was the fact that unhealthy minds have often claimed, as their revelation from God, an experience which might, with more truth, be