His theory of knowledge he had derived eclectically
and somewhat eccentrically, from Lotze and Kant.
To this day not all, either of his friends or foes,
are quite certain what it was. It is open to doubt
whether Ritschl really arrived at his theory of cognition
and then made it one of the bases of his theology.
It is conceivable that he made his theology and then
propounded his theory of cognition in its defence.
In a word, the basis of distinction between religious
and scientific knowledge is not to be sought in its
object. It is to be found in the sphere of the
subject, in the difference of attitude of the subject
toward the object. Religion is concerned with
what he calls
Werthurtheile, judgments of value,
considerations of our relation to the world, which
are of moment solely in accordance with their value
in awakening feelings of pleasure or of pain.
The thought of God, for example, must be treated solely
as a judgment of value. It is a conception which
is of worth for the attainment of good, for our spiritual
peace and victory over the world. What God is
in himself we cannot know, an existential Judgment
we cannot form without going over to the metaphysicians.
What God is to us we can know simply as religious
men and solely upon the basis of religious experience.
God is holy love. That is a religious value-judgment.
But what sort of a being God must be in order that
we may assign to him these attributes, we cannot say
without leaving the basis of experience. This
is pragmatism indeed. It opens up boundless possibilities
of subjectivism in a man who was apparently only too
matter-of-fact.
There was a time in his career when Ritschl was popular
with both conservatives and liberals. There were
long years in which he was bitterly denounced by both.
Yet there was something in the man and in his teaching
which went beyond all the antagonisms of the schools.
There can be no doubt that it was the intention of
Ritschl to build his theology solely upon the gospel
of Jesus Christ. The joy and confidence with
which this theology could be preached, Ritschl awakened
in his pupils in a degree which had not been equalled
by any theologian since Schleiermacher himself.
Numbers who, in the time of philosophical and scientific
uncertainty, had lost their courage, regained it in
contact with his confident and deeply religious spirit.
A wholesome nature, eminently objective in temper,
concentrated with all his force upon his task, of
rare dialectical gifts, he had a great sense of humour
and occasionally also the faculty of bitterly sarcastic
speech. His very figure radiated the delight
of conflict as he walked the Goettingen wall.