indeed the superficial desire to indulge his passions.  There is also the latent longing to be conformed to the good.  There is the sense that he fulfils himself then only when he is obedient to the good.  One of the great facts of spiritual experience is this gradual, or even sudden, inversion of standard within us.  We do really cease to desire the things which are against right reason and conscience.  We come to desire the good, even if it shall cost us pain and sacrifice to do it.  Paul could write:  ’When I would do good, evil is present with me.’  But, in the vividness of his identification of his willing self with his better self against his sinning self, he could also write:  ‘So then it is no more I that do the sin.’ Das radicale Boese of human nature is less radical than Kant supposed, and ’the categorical imperative’ of duty less externally categorical than he alleged.  Still it is the great merit of Kant’s philosophy to have brought out with all possible emphasis, not merely as against the optimism of the shallow, but as against the hedonism of soberer people, that our life is a conflict between inclination and duty.  The claims of duty are the higher ones.  They are mandatory, absolute.  We do our duty whether or not we superficially desire to do it.  We do our duty whether or not we foresee advantage in having done it.  We should do it if we foresaw with clearness disadvantage.  We should find our satisfaction in having done it, even at the cost of all our other satisfactions.  There is a must which is over and above all our desires.  This is what Kant really means by the categorical imperative.  Nevertheless, his statement comes in conflict with the principle of freedom, which is one of the most fundamental in his system.  The phrases above used only eddy about the one point which is to be held fast.  There may be that in the universe which destroys the man who does not conform to it, but in the last analysis he is self-destroyed, that is, he chooses not to conform.  If he is saved, it is because he chooses thus to conform.  Man would be then most truly man in resisting that which would merely overpower him, even if it were goodness.  Of course, there can be no goodness which overpowers.  There can be no goodness which is not willed.  Nothing can be a motive except through awakening our desire.  That which one desires is never wholly external to oneself.

According to Kant, morality becomes religion when that which the former shows to be the end of man is conceived also to be the end of the supreme law-giver, God.  Religion is the recognition of our duties as divine commands.  The distinction between revealed and natural religion is stated thus:  In the former we know a thing to be a divine command before we recognise it as our duty.  In the latter we know it to be our duty before we recognise it as a divine command.  Religion may be both natural and revealed.  Its tenets may be such that man can be conceived as arriving