(iv.) It is certain that since the Armistice there has been a great flight abroad of the foreign securities still remaining in private hands.  This is exceedingly difficult to prevent.  German foreign investments are as a rule in the form of bearer securities and are not registered.  They are easily smuggled abroad across Germany’s extensive land frontiers, and for some months before the conclusion of peace it was certain that their owners would not be allowed to retain them if the Allied Governments could discover any method of getting hold of them.  These factors combined to stimulate human ingenuity, and the efforts both of the Allied and of the German Governments to interfere effectively with the outflow are believed to have been largely futile.

In face of all these considerations, it will be a miracle if much remains for Reparation.  The countries of the Allies and of the United States, the countries of Germany’s own allies, and the neutral countries adjacent to Germany exhaust between them almost the whole of the civilized world; and, as we have seen, we cannot expect much to be available for Reparation from investments in any of these quarters.  Indeed there remain no countries of importance for investments except those of South America.

To convert the significance of these deductions into figures involves much guesswork.  I give the reader the best personal estimate I can form after pondering the matter in the light of the available figures and other relevant data.

I put the deduction under (i.) at $1,500,000,000, of which $500,000,000 may be ultimately available after meeting private debts, etc.

As regards (ii.)—­according to a census taken by the Austrian Ministry of Finance on the 31st December, 1912, the nominal value of the Austro-Hungarian securities held by Germans was $986,500,000.  Germany’s pre-war investments in Russia outside Government securities have been estimated at $475,000,000, which is much lower than would be expected, and in 1906 Sartorius v.  Waltershausen estimated her investments in Russian Government securities at $750,000,000.  This gives a total of $1,225,000,000, which is to some extent borne out by the figure of $1,000,000,000 given in 1911 by Dr. Ischchanian as a deliberately modest estimate.  A Roumanian estimate, published at the time of that country’s entry in the war, gave the value of Germany’s investments in Roumania at $20,000,000 to $22,000,000, of which $14,000,000 to $16,000,000 were in Government securities.  An association for the defense of French interests in Turkey, as reported in the Temps (Sept. 8, 1919), has estimated the total amount of German capital invested in Turkey at about $295,000,000, of which, according to the latest Report of the Council of Foreign Bondholders, $162,500,000 was held by German nationals in the Turkish External Debt.  No estimates are available to me of Germany’s investments in Bulgaria.  Altogether I venture a deduction of $2,500,000,000 in respect of this group of countries as a whole.