perfect security by means of fortifications only.  Valuable as such works will be to them, they must be further garrisoned by coast-defence ships, whose part in repelling an enemy will be co-ordinated with that of the batteries.  The sphere of action of such ships should not be permitted to extend far beyond the port to which they are allotted, and of whose defence they form an essential part; but within that sweep they will always be a powerful reinforcement to the sea-going navy, when the strategic conditions of a war cause hostilities to centre around their port.  By sacrificing power to go long distances, the coast-defence ship gains proportionate weight of armor and guns; that is, of defensive and offensive strength.  It therefore adds an element of unique value to the fleet with which it for a time acts.  No foreign states, except Great Britain, have ports so near our Pacific coast as to bring it within the radius of action of their coast-defence ships; and it is very doubtful whether even Great Britain will put such ships at Vancouver Island, the chief value of which will be lost to her when the Canadian Pacific is severed,—­a blow always in the power of this country.  It is upon our Atlantic seaboard that the mistress of Halifax, of Bermuda, and of Jamaica will now defend Vancouver and the Canadian Pacific.  In the present state of our seaboard defence she can do so absolutely.  What is all Canada compared with our exposed great cities?  Even were the coast fortified, she still could do so, if our navy be no stronger than is designed as yet.  What harm can we do Canada proportionate to the injury we should suffer by the interruption of our coasting trade, and by a blockade of Boston, New York, the Delaware, and the Chesapeake?  Such a blockade Great Britain certainly could make technically efficient, under the somewhat loose definitions of international law.  Neutrals would accept it as such.

The military needs of the Pacific States, as well as their supreme importance to the whole country, are yet a matter of the future, but of a future so near that provision should begin immediately.  To weigh their importance, consider what influence in the Pacific would be attributed to a nation comprising only the States of Washington, Oregon, and California, when filled with such men as now people them and still are pouring in, and which controlled such maritime centres as San Francisco, Puget Sound, and the Columbia River.  Can it be counted less because they are bound by the ties of blood and close political union to the great communities of the East?  But such influence, to work without jar and friction, requires underlying military readiness, like the proverbial iron hand under the velvet glove.  To provide this, three things are needful:  First, protection of the chief harbors, by fortifications and coast-defence ships, which gives defensive strength, provides security to the community within, and supplies the bases necessary to all military operations.  Secondly, naval force,