It is not in the preparation of material that states generally fall most short of being ready for war at brief notice; for such preparation is chiefly a question of money and of manufacture,—­not so much of preservation after creation.  If money enough is forthcoming, a moderate degree of foresight can insure that the amount of material deemed necessary shall be on hand at a given future moment; and a similar condition can be maintained steadily.  Losses by deterioration or expenditure, or demand for further increase if such appear desirable, can all be forecast with reasonable calculations, and requirements thence arising can be made good.  This is comparatively easy, because mere material, once wrought into shape for war, does not deteriorate from its utility to the nation because not used immediately.  It can be stored and cared for at a relatively small expense, and with proper oversight will remain just as good and just as ready for use as at its first production.  There are certain deductions, a certain percentage of impairment to be allowed for, but the general statement holds.

A very different question is confronted in the problem how to be ready at equally short notice to use this material,—­to provide in sufficient numbers, upon a sudden call, the living agents, without whom the material is worthless.  Such men in our day must be especially trained; and not only so, but while training once acquired will not be forgot wholly—­stays by a man for a certain time—­it nevertheless tends constantly to drop off from him.  Like all habits, it requires continued practice.  Moreover, it takes quite a long time to form, in a new recruit, not merely familiarity with the use of a particular weapon, but also the habit and working of the military organization of which he is an individual member.  It is not enough that he learn just that one part of the whole machinery which falls to him to handle; he must be acquainted with the mutual relations of the other parts to his own and to the whole, at least in great measure.  Such knowledge is essential even to the full and intelligent discharge of his own duty, not to speak of the fact that in battle every man should be ready to supply the place of another of his own class and grade who has been disabled.  Unless this be so, the ship will be very far short of her best efficiency.

Now, to possess such proficiency in the handling of naval material for war, and in playing an intelligent part in the general functioning of a ship in action, much time is required.  Time is required to obtain it, further time is needed in order to retain it; and such time, be it more or less, is time lost for other purposes,—­lost both to the individual and to the community.  When you have your thoroughly efficient man-of-war’s man, you cannot store him as you do your guns and ammunition, or lay him up as you may your ships, without his deteriorating at a rate to which material presents no parallel.  On the other hand, if he be retained, voluntarily or otherwise, in the naval service, there ensues the economical loss—­the loss of productive power—­which constitutes the great argument against large standing armies and enforced military service, advanced by those to whom the productive energies of a country outweigh all other considerations.