Zoonomia, Vol. I eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 655 pages of information about Zoonomia, Vol. I.

Zoonomia, Vol. I eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 655 pages of information about Zoonomia, Vol. I.

The impossibility of two bodies existing together in the same space cannot be deduced from our idea of solidity, or of figure.  As soon as we perceive the motions of objects that surround us, and learn that we possess a power to move our own bodies, we experience, that those objects, which excite in us the idea of solidity and of figure, oppose this voluntary movement of our own organs; as whilst I endeavour to compress between my hands an ivory ball into a spheroid.  And we are hence taught by experience, that our own body and those, which we touch, cannot exist in the same part of space.

But this by no means demonstrates, that no two bodies can exist together in the same part of space.  Galilaeo in the preface to his works seems to be of opinion, that matter is not impenetrable; Mr. Michel, and Mr. Boscowich in his Theoria.  Philos.  Natur. have espoused this hypothesis:  which has been lately published by Dr. Priestley, to whom the world is much indebted for so many important discoveries in science. (Hist. of Light and Colours, p. 391.) The uninterrupted passage of light through transparent bodies, of the electric aether through metallic and aqueous bodies, and of the magnetic effluvia through all bodies, would seem to give some probability to this opinion.  Hence it appears, that beings may exist without possessing the property of solidity, as well as they can exist without possessing the properties, which excite our smell or taste, and can thence occupy space without detruding other bodies from it; but we cannot become acquainted with such beings by our sense of touch, any more than we can with odours or flavours without our senses of smell and taste.

But that any being can exist without existing in space, is to my ideas utterly incomprehensible.  My appeal is to common sense. To be implies a when and a where; the one is comparing it with the motions of other beings, and the other with their situations.

If there was but one object, as the whole creation may be considered as one object, then I cannot ask where it exists? for there are no other objects to compare its situation with.  Hence if any one denies, that a being exists in space, he denies, that there are any other beings but that one; for to answer the question, “Where does it exist?” is only to mention the situation of the objects that surround it.

In the same manner if it be asked—­“When does a being exist?” The answer only specifies the successive motions either of itself, or of other bodies; hence to say, a body exists not in time, is to say, that there is, or was, no motion in the world.

4. Of the Spirit of Animation.

But though there may exist beings in the universe, that have not the property of solidity; that is, which can possess any part of space, at the same time that it is occupied by other bodies; yet there may be other beings, that can assume this property of solidity, or disrobe themselves of it occasionally, as we are taught of spirits, and of angels; and it would seem, that THE SPIRIT OF ANIMATION must be endued with this property, otherwise how could it occasionally give motion to the limbs of animals?—­or be itself stimulated into motion by the obtrusions of surrounding bodies, as of light, or odour?

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Zoonomia, Vol. I from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.