The objects of desire and aversion are generally at a distance, whereas those of pleasure and pain are immediately acting upon our organs.  Hence, before desire or aversion are exerted, so as to cause any actions, there is generally time for deliberation; which consists in discovering the means to obtain the object of desire, or to avoid the object of aversion; or in examining the good or bad consequences, which may result from them.  In this case it is evident, that we have a power to delay the proposed action, or to perform it; and this power of choosing, whether we shall act or not, is in common language expressed by the word volition, or will.  Whereas in this work the word volition means simply the active state of the sensorial faculty in producing motion in consequence of desire or aversion:  whether we have the power of restraining that action, or not; that is, whether we exert any actions in consequence of opposite desires or aversions, or not.

For if the objects of desire or aversion are present, there is no necessity to investigate or compare the means of obtaining them, nor do we always deliberate about their consequences; that is, no deliberation necessarily intervenes, and in consequence the power of choosing to act or not is not exerted.  It is probable, that this twofold use of the word volition in all languages has confounded the metaphysicians, who have disputed about free will and necessity.  Whereas from the above analysis it would appear, that during our sleep, we use no voluntary exertions at all; and in our waking hours, that they are the consequence of desire or aversion.

To will is to act in consequence of desire; but to desire means to desire something, even if that something be only to become free from the pain, which causes the desire; for to desire nothing is not to desire; the word desire, therefore, includes both the action and the object or motive; for the object and motive of desire are the same thing.  Hence to desire without an object, that is, without a motive, is a solecism in language.  As if one should ask, if you could eat without food, or breathe without air.

From this account of volition it appears, that convulsions of the muscles, as in epileptic fits, may in the common sense of that word be termed involuntary; because no deliberation is interposed between the desire or aversion and the consequent action; but in the sense of the word, as above defined, they belong to the class of voluntary motions, as delivered in Vol.  II.  Class III.  If this use of the word be discordant to the ear of the reader, the term morbid voluntary motions, or motions in consequence of aversion, may be substituted in its stead.