A Handbook of the Boer War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 415 pages of information about A Handbook of the Boer War.

A Handbook of the Boer War eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 415 pages of information about A Handbook of the Boer War.

The rules of the game were strictly obeyed, and there was “a thorough preparation by artillery” before the infantry was allowed to advance.  The movement was delayed until half a hundred guns were playing upon Vaalkrantz and the chance of a celer et audax exploit was lost.  At 2 p.m.  Lyttelton with two battalions of the 4th Brigade was permitted to cross the pontoon and with these he worked up under the protection of the left bank, and emerging upon Munger’s Farm, rose thence to the southern edge of Vaalkrantz, and took hold of the ridge.  Here he was joined by a battalion of Hildyard’s Brigade, whose original orders to occupy Green Hill were cancelled, and later on by the remaining battalions of his own brigade; which Buller, wavering for a time, had held back, as the pontoon and the open ground were under fire from the right flank.  At 4 p.m.  Lyttelton was established on the main hill of Vaalkrantz, and during the night the position was entrenched.  The occupation, however, brought two facts to light.  Half a mile to the north of the main hill was another hill, only a few feet lower, unapproachable and in the enemy’s possession; and it was not practicable, as Buller had hoped, to bring up artillery on to the position seized by Lyttelton.

At daylight on February 6, the situation was favourable to the Boers.  Botha had arrived and had taken over the command from Prinsloo.  The heavy gun sent from Ladysmith had been mounted on Doom Kop, which was now held by reinforcements under L. Meyer; other good positions east of Vaalkrantz had been strengthened; and some of the guns on the Brakfontein position had been moved round.  Vaalkrantz standing between Doorn Kop and the Twin Peaks, was shelled simultaneously from the left front, and the right rear, as well as from Green Hill;[28] it seemed as if Spion Kop were about to be repeated.

Buller opened on Green Hill with artillery, and on the hill north of the main hill of Vaalkrantz, in the hope of making the North Hill assailable.  In view of a retirement, a pontoon bridge was, at Lyttelton’s request, thrown across the river under the main ridge.  He discouraged a proposal made by Buller to attack the North Hill by a force creeping along the foot of the westward slope of Vaalkrantz, covered by fire from the ridge.

Buller was now stalemated.  The artillery fire had not cleared the way to the North Hill, and Lyttelton was unable to move on it, but he said that he could hold on for the rest of the day if no more artillery were brought to bear on him from the S.E.

Finally Buller determined to shift the responsibility.  He reported the capture of Vaalkrantz to Lord Roberts, and in effect asked what he should do with the white elephant.  To carry out his plan would “cost from 2,000 to 3,000 men,” and he was “not confident of success.”  Was Ladysmith worth it?  Yes, replied Lord Roberts without hesitation, Ladysmith was worth it and it must be done.

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A Handbook of the Boer War from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.