The raid on Stormberg had manifestly failed and Gatacre ordered a retreat to Molteno.  Thither the weary, dispirited column trudged all through the forenoon of December 10.  A gun was abandoned on the way, and even the wagon in which the breech block had been secreted fell also into the enemy’s hands.  But this was a comparatively insignificant loss.  It was soon discovered that nearly a third of the infantry was absent.  When the troops were withdrawn from the attack on Kissieberg not a few of them remained in the donga or under the krantzes on the hill side, while others appear to have held on to the ridge.  By some extraordinary neglect or default nearly 600 men were left to their fate.  No one seems to have missed them at the time and they were made prisoners of war without an effort to extricate them.

In less than two hours all the fighting except the little affair with Grobler was over.  On neither side were the casualties of killed and wounded heavy.  No British officer was killed and of the eight who were wounded four had been struck by shells not fired by the enemy.

* * * * *

Stonmberg on December 10, followed by Magersfontein on December 13, brought about Colenso on December 15.  The latter was Buller’s attempt to retrieve the former mishaps.

A naturally strong position on the left bank of the Tugela had by the efforts of the Boers during the previous three weeks been almost perfectly secured.  They showed, however, some hesitation with regard to Hlangwhane, a detached hill on the right bank from which the Tugela line could be enfiladed.  It was a somewhat precarious position as it was accessible from the left bank only by two bridle drifts.  It had been originally held by the Boers, but the garrison was withdrawn when Barton’s Brigade appeared at Chieveley; and now all Botha’s persistence, and even a reference to Kruger and Joubert at Pretoria, were required to induce the burghers to re-occupy it on December 15.  From the south Hlangwhane, though separated from the Colenso kopjes by the river, appears to be an integral continuation of them.

[Illustration:  Colenso Battlefield.]

The enemy’s general idea was a defensive occupation of the Colenso position, although Botha, with characteristic spirit, proposed to send a commando across the river to face the British on the open.  The initiative, always a disadvantage when attacking an enemy strongly posted and entrenched, was thus imposed upon Buller.  It was not doubted that he would be compelled to make a frontal attack on Colenso and in this the Boers showed the more correct appreciation of the situation.  Botha hoped to lure Buller on and was prepared even to allow him to cross the river; and having crushed him to act upon the British flanks, an operation which the wide extension of Botha’s front from Hlangwhane to Robinson’s farm, a distance of seven miles, gave him a good chance of being able to carry out.  If necessary, reinforcements could be drawn from the investing circle around Ladysmith, which seemed to be detaining more burghers than were necessary for the maintenance of the siege.