The Guards’ Brigade under Colvile was in the first instance detailed as the reserve of the Highland Brigade, but the repulse of the latter and the probability that it would sooner or later be compelled to retreat gave the former a definite objective, the low arc held by the left of the Boer line.  In marching on this the wire fence which was the boundary between British territory and the Orange Free State was crossed, and the Guards’ Brigade had the honour of being the first body of troops to go into action in the enemy’s country.  Colvile held his own, but although he was unable to occupy the arc he screened the right flank of the Highlanders.  On their left a weak Brigade under Pole-Carew was drawn up astride the railway, and thus apparently the firing line, which had been so hardly pressed during so many weary hours, was secure on either flank.  But Pole-Carew was paralysed by the variety of the duties which had been assigned to him, and was unable to operate offensively on the enemy’s right.  His original orders were to act as camp guard and to demonstrate northwards in support of the Highland Brigade; and subsequently he seems to have been instructed to hold himself in readiness to cross over to support the Guards’ attack on the enemy’s left, with the result that his Brigade was never seriously engaged.

The interval between the Highlanders’ right facing the trenches and the Guards’ left had never been effectively closed and early in the afternoon the Boers renewed their attacks upon it, and threatened to enfilade the line.  Hughes-Hallett, who after the death of Wauchope succeeded to the command of the Highland Brigade and to whom Methuen had sent orders to hold on until nightfall, asked Colvile in vain to support him and at last was compelled to throw back his right.  Methuen’s orders were unfortunately known only to Hughes-Hallett and the movement was interpreted as an order from the brigadier for a general retirement.  The wave of retreat beginning on the right passed rapidly down the line, and soon all but a few score of men who held on gallantly as long as there was light were streaming back in confusion to the field batteries in rear.  Even the shelter of the guns did not wholly avail them for protection, for they were shelled while rallying by the Boer guns which had been strangely silent during the battle; and the retreat was continued to the bivouac ground which so many more of them, now lying on the veld, had quitted seventeen hours before.  The battle was lost.

It is probable that if the work had been more evenly distributed the result might have been, at least, less disastrous.  An intolerable strain was put upon one Brigade which it was unable to bear.  The Highlanders were blundered into action, then abandoned to their fate for many hours, and finally withdrawn by a misunderstanding.  The inequality of the tasks set to the various columns is strikingly shown in the return of casualties.  To the total of 948 killed and wounded the Highland Brigade contributed no less than 752.  Two of its battalions lost 37 per cent of their strength; while the losses of the Division were but 7 per cent.