This difference of interpretation lays the foundation of misunderstanding, but it does far more harm than this.  It must keep Irish Nationalists alarmed, and not without reason, for the permanence of the independence which they may have obtained.  A change of feeling or a change of party may cause the Imperial Parliament to assert its reserved authority.  England keeps her pledges.[105] Yes, but here it is not a mere question of good faith.  When two contractors each from the beginning put bona fide a different interpretation upon their contract, neither of them is chargeable with dishonesty for acting in accordance with his own view of the agreement.  The spirit of Unionism and the spirit of Separation will survive the creation of the new constitution.  Under one form or another Unionists will be opposed to Federalists and it is more than possible, should the Bill pass, that the division of English parties may turn upon their reading of the Irish Government Act, 1893.

The possibility, again, that the Parliament at Westminster may assert its reserved authority, if it raises the fears of Irishman, may excite the hopes of English politicians.  If at any time the supremacy of Ireland becomes unbearable to British national sentiment, or if the condition of Ireland menaces or is thought to menace English interests, the new constitution places in the hands of a British majority a ready-made weapon for the restoration of British power.  The result might be attained without the necessity for passing any Act of Parliament, or of repealing a single section of the Irish Government Act, 1893.  A strong Viceroy might be sent to Ireland; he might be instructed not to convoke the Irish Parliament at all; or, having convoked, at once to prorogue it.  He might thereupon form any Ministry he chose out of the members of the Irish Privy Council.  The Imperial Parliament would at once resume its present position and could pass laws for Ireland.  This might be called revolution or reaction.  For my argument it matters not two straws by what name this policy be designated.  The scheme sketched out is not a policy which I recommend.  My contention is not that it will be expedient—­this is a matter depending upon circumstances which no man can foresee—­but that it will be strictly and absolutely legal.

The supremacy of the Imperial Parliament, combined with the presence of the Irish members at Westminster, will thus by a curious fatality turn out a source at once of permanent disquietude to Ireland and of immediate, if not of permanent, weakness to England.

Our New Constitution is not made to last Home Rule does not close a controversy; it opens a revolution.

No one in truth expects that the new constitution will stand.  Its very builders hesitate when they speak of its permanence,[106] and are grateful for the generous credulity of a friend who believes in its finality.  Nor is it hard to conjecture (and in such a matter nothing but conjecture is possible) what are the forces or tendencies which threaten its destruction.