affirm they were not tyrannical governments:  but all the commonwealths or kingdoms I have seen or read of, have, it seems to me, a savor of tyranny.  Nor is it a matter for astonishment that parties and factions have often prevailed in Florence, and that one man has arisen to make himself the chief, when we reflect that the city is very populous, that many of the burghers desire to share in its advantages, and that there are few prizes to distribute:  wherefore one party always must have the upper hand and enjoy the honors and benefits of the state, while the other stands by to watch the game.’  He then proceeds to criticise France, where the nobles alone bear arms and pay no taxes, and where the administration of justice is slow and expensive; and Venice, where three thousand gentlemen keep more than 100,000 of the inhabitants below their feet, unhonored, powerless, unprivileged, oppressed.  Having demonstrated the elements of tyranny and injustice both in a kingdom and a commonwealth reputed prosperous and free, he shows that, according to his own philosophy, no blame attaches to a burgher who succeeds in usurping the sole mastery of a free state, provided he rule wisely; for all kingdoms were originally founded either by force or by craft.  ’We ought not therefore to call that private citizen a tyrant who has usurped the government of his state, if he be a good man; nor again to call a man the real lord of a city who, though he has the investiture of the Emperor, is bad and malevolent.’  This critique of constitutions from the pen of a doctrinaire, who was also a man of experience, is interesting, partly for its positive frankness, and partly as showing what elementary notions still prevailed about the purposes of government.  Vettori’s ultimate criterion is the personal quality of the ambitious ruler.

    [1] Giovanni and Giulio were afterwards Leo X. and Clement VII.

    [2] P. 293.

Passing to what he says about Leo X.,[1] it is worth while to note that he attributes his election chiefly to the impression produced upon the Cardinals by Alexander and Julius.  ’During the reign of two fierce and powerful Pontiffs, Cardinals had been put to death, imprisoned, deprived of their property, exiled, and kept in continual alarm; and so great was the dread among them now of electing another such Pope, that they unanimously chose Giovanni de’ Medici.  Up to that time he had always shown himself liberal and easy, or, rather, prodigal in squandering the little that he owned; he had moreover managed so to dissemble as to acquire a reputation for most excellent habits of life.’  Vettori adds that his power in Florence helped him, and that he owed much to the ability displayed by Bernardo da Bibbiena in winning votes.  The joy of the Florentines at his election is attributed to mean motives:  ’being all of them given over to commerce and gain, they thought they ought to get some profit from this Papacy.’[2]