At last, on the 28th August, as the Convention was drawing to a close, on the consideration of the article providing for the privileges of citizens in different States, we meet the first reference to this matter, in words worthy of note.  “General (Charles Cotesworth) Pinckney was not satisfied with it.  He SEEMED to wish some provision should be included in favor of property in slaves.”  But he made no proposition.  Unwilling to shock the Convention, and uncertain in his own mind, he only seemed to wish such a provision.  In this vague expression of a vague desire this idea first appeared.  In this modest, hesitating phrase is the germ of the audacious, unhesitating Slave Act.  Here is the little vapor, which has since swollen, as in the Arabian tale, to the power and dimensions of a giant.  The next article under discussion provided for the surrender of fugitives from justice.  Mr. Butler and Mr. Charles Pinckney, both from South Carolina, now moved openly to require “fugitive slaves and servants to be delivered up like criminals.”  Here was no disguise.  With Hamlet, it was now said in spirit,

“Seems, Madam!  Nay it is.  I know not seems.”

But the very boldness of the effort drew attention and opposition.  Mr. Wilson, of Pennsylvania, the learned jurist and excellent man, at once objected:  “This would oblige the Executive of the State to do it at the public expense.”  Mr. Sherman, of Connecticut, “saw no more propriety in the public seizing and surrendering a slave or servant than a horse.”  Under the pressure of these objections, the offensive proposition was withdrawn,—­never more to be renewed.  The article for the surrender of criminals was then unanimously adopted.  On the next day, 29th August, profiting by the suggestions already made, Mr. Butler moved a proposition,—­substantially like that now found in the Constitution,—­for the surrender, not of “fugitive slaves,” as originally proposed, but simply of “persons bound to service or labor,” which, without debate or opposition of any kind, was unanimously adopted.’

Here, palpably, was no labor of compromise, no adjustment of conflicting interest,—­nor even any expression of solicitude.  The clause finally adopted was vague and faint as the original suggestion.  In its natural import it is not applicable to slaves.  If supposed by some to be applicable, it is clear that it was supposed by others to be inapplicable.  It is now insisted that the term “persons bound to service,” or “held to service,” as expressed in the final revision, is the equivalent or synonym for “slaves.”  This interpretation is rebuked by an incident to which reference has been already made, but which will bear repetition.  On the 13th September—­a little more than a fortnight after the clause was adopted, and when, if deemed to be of any significance, it could not have been forgotten—­the very word “service,” came under debate, and received a fixed meaning.  It was unanimously adopted as a substitute for “servitude”