But the honorable member has satirized, with peculiar acrimony, the powers given to the general government by this Constitution.  I conceive that the first question on this subject is, whether these powers be necessary; if they be, we are reduced to the dilemma of either submitting to the inconvenience, or losing the Union.  Let us consider the most important of these reprobated powers; that of direct taxation is most generally objected to.  With respect to the exigencies of government, there is no question but the most easy mode of providing for them will be adopted.  When, therefore, direct taxes are not necessary, they will not be recurred to.  It can be of little advantage to those in power, to raise money in a manner oppressive to the people.  To consult the conveniences of the people, will cost them nothing, and in many respects will be advantageous to them.  Direct taxes will only be recurred to for great purposes.  What has brought on other nations those immense debts, under the pressure of which many of them labor?  Not the expenses of their governments, but war.  If this country should be engaged in war, (and I conceive we ought to provide for the possibility of such a case,) how would it be carried on?  By the usual means provided from year to year?  As our imports will be necessary for the expenses of government, and other common exigencies, how are we to carry on the means of defence?  How is it possible a war could be supported without money or credit?  And would it be possible for government to have credit, without having the power of raising money?  No, it would be impossible for any government, in such a case, to defend itself.  Then, I say, sir, that it is necessary to establish funds for extraordinary exigencies, and give this power to the general government; for the utter inutility of previous requisitions on the States is too well known.  Would it be possible for those countries, whose finances and revenues are carried to the highest perfection, to carry on the operations of government on great emergencies, such as the maintenance of a war, without an uncontrolled power of raising money?  Has it not been necessary for Great Britain, notwithstanding the facility of the collection of her taxes, to have recourse very often to this and other extraordinary methods of procuring money?  Would not her public credit have been ruined, if it was known that her power to raise money was limited?  Has not France been obliged, on great occasions, to recur to unusual means, in order to raise funds?  It has been the case in many countries, and no government can exist unless its powers extend to make provisions for every contingency.  If we were actually attacked by a powerful nation, and our general government had not the power of raising money, but depended solely on requisitions, our condition would be truly deplorable:  if the revenues of this commonwealth were to depend on twenty distinct authorities, it would be impossible for it to carry on its operations.  This must be obvious to every member here:  I think, therefore, that it is necessary for the preservation of the Union, that this power should be given to the general government.