Already has Balbi, in his Ethnographic Atlas, given us a list of names and coincidences to an extent truly astonishing.  Yet what is this, in fact, but a judicious use of Bacon’s old but much-neglected rule of questioning nature about facts instead of theories—­examining evidences ere rhetoric had made language one vast heap of implied falsehood?

In a court of inquiry we examine witnesses as to facts, not opinions.  But the historian reads mankind in cities; the philosopher in the clouds.  He who is anxious for the truth should look abroad on the plains or in the woods, where man’s first prerogative, the giving of names, was exercised.  His knowledge of nature must be wretchedly imperfect who thinks that no grand outline of truth can possibly exist in the dim records of human recollection ere the pen of the scholar was employed to depict the scenes that opinion or prejudice had created.  How many pages of Clarendon’s, Hume’s, or even Robertson’s history would be cancelled if we had access to all the recollections of each event, and the evidence of the unlettered vulgar who had witnessed the fact brought to our notice, even through the mouthpiece of tradition!

There is more truth than comes to the surface in that speech put into the lips of the father of lies by a late poet, where he says—­

     “The Bible’s your book—­history mine.”

Savigny makes the same charge against one class of historians in his own country:—­“However discordant,” says he, “their other doctrines may appear, they agree in the practice of adopting each a particular system, and in viewing all historical evidence as so many proofs of its truth.”

Were it not for that contempt we have already noticed as the offspring of pride and dogmatism, and which, in the administration of the republic of letters, has been entertained and openly proclaimed for every kind of history except that which its own acts may have originated, we should have been in possession of thousands of facts and notions now overlaid and lost irrecoverably to the philosopher and the historian.

The origin and the progress of nations, next after the school divinity of the Middle Ages, has occasioned the most copious outpouring of conjectural criticism.  The simple mode of research suggested by the works of Verstegan, Camden, and Spelman would, long before this time, have made the early history of the British tribes as clear as it is now obscure.  Analogies in the primary sounds of each dialect; similarity or difference in regard to objects of the first, or of a common necessity; rules or laws for the succession of property, which are as various as the tribes which overran the empire; the nature, agreement, or dissimilarity in religious worship with those vestiges of its ritual and celebration which, by the “pious frauds” and connivance of the early church, still lurk in the pastimes of our rural districts:—­the new science of which we have spoken, by taking cognisance of these and all other existing sources of legitimate investigation, will settle the source and affinities of nations upon a plan as much superior to that of Grotius and his school as fact and reason exceed the guess-work of the theorist and the historian.  Meantime we would cite a few examples that illustrate and bear more particularly on the subject to which our inquiries have been directed.