first departed from at the commencement of the reign of Geo. III., when a fixed sum was appointed, instead of that mode of payment, for its support.  In process of time the expenses of the civil government increased, and the Civil List became a debt.  The consequence was, that in the year 1815, an inquiry was instituted into the circumstances which had caused this increase of charges upon the Civil List, up to the period of the Regency.  What was the course then adopted by Parliament?  Why, it was to bring certain charges—­as, for instance, the charges for ambassadors and ministers abroad—­under the annual vote of Parliament; and the immediate object was to avoid thereby the fixing of any fresh debt, for which no estimate could be previously made, upon the Civil List.  In 1820 it was determined that nothing whatever should be brought before Parliament, in connexion with the Civil List, that was a casual expense, or for which a regular vote could not be submitted.

The original system, I have already stated, had been departed from in the reign of George III., and the late Government in presenting their civil list made a still further departure from it, and upon this principle;—­wherever a part of a salary was to be paid out of the civil list, and part out of the consolidated fund, it was resolved to pay all out of the consolidated fund.  The course was adopted with regard to the salaries of the Judges, the Lord Chancellor, and the Speaker of the House of Commons, and also of various other offices, some of which have been since abolished.  This was thought a less objectionable mode than that of subjecting those salaries to an annual discussion in the Committee of the House of Commons.  We wished my Lords to place those salaries upon the consolidated fund, in order to prevent the possibility of the country being left without a proper and efficient administration of public affairs.  We did not wish to leave the Government to the chance of being impeded by a small majority, in the House of Commons, which, according to other proposed plans, might diminish the salaries of public officers at pleasure.  If my Lord we look to the period of the Revolution we shall find that there were long discussions respecting the right of the crown to its hereditary revenues, which ended in a concession of the principle that these revenues did belong to the crown.  At that time nobody ever dreamed of separating the expenses of the crown from those of the civil government, and of making a separate provision for the support of the state and dignity of the crown, which should be subject to the controul of parliament.  The plan of separation, my Lords, is one of modern invention altogether, and I totally dissent from it.  Because, let us look to the situation in which the crown is placed under the operation of such a system, and we must observe that it will place the crown in a situation such as it ought not to be reduced to; namely that it will render it liable to be deprived of the assistance—­say of a public officer, whose salary may be lost by a single vote in a committee of supply.