Finance makes or mars Federations.  Some Federations or organic Unions of independent States have come into being through a strong desire in the separate States to have, among other things, a common system of Customs, and in the case of the German Empire and the South African Union a Customs Union or Zollverein has preceded Federation.  These phenomena are the most marked illustration of the general truth that a common desire to federate, or unite, on the part of individual States is a condition precedent to a sound Federation or Union.  On the other hand, finance, especially the question of joint Customs, has sometimes presented obstacles to a Federation which, on other grounds, was earnestly desired.  The long delay in achieving the Australian Federation was largely due to the desire of New South Wales to maintain her Free Trade system, while the financial arrangements generally caused most of the practical difficulties met with in arranging the Federation both of Canada and Australia, and in their subsequent domestic relations.  Nova Scotia in the former case, and Western Australia in the latter, held out to the last instant, and the former subsequently had to receive exceptionally favourable treatment.  In both Federations some measure of friction is chronic, and in neither has a perfectly satisfactory system been evolved.  The Union of Ireland and Great Britain in 1800 was in this respect, as in all others, a flagrant departure from sound principle.  The Customs Union which followed it was a forced Customs Union, and, together with the other financial arrangements between the two countries, has produced results incredibly absurd and mischievous.  Some of these results I briefly indicated in Chapter V. In the following chapters I shall tell the whole story fully, and I hope to convince the reader that we should follow, not only historically, but morally and practically, the correct line of action if, in dissolving the Legislative Union, we dissolve the Customs Union also.  That would involve a virtually independent system of finance for Ireland, and place her fiscally in the position of a self-governing Colony.  If and when a real Federation of the United Kingdom becomes practical politics, she would then have the choice of entering it in the spirit and on the terms invariably associated with all true Federations or Unions.  That is, she would voluntarily relinquish, in her own interest, financial and other rights to a central Government solely concerned with central affairs.

I need scarcely point out in this connection the vital importance of the question of representation at Westminster.  Ireland resembles the self-governing Colonies, and differs from Great Britain, in that the greater part of the revenue raised from her inhabitants is derived from Customs and Excise—­that is, from the indirect taxation of commodities of common use.  If she is denied control of these sources of revenue under the coming Bill, it will be absolutely necessary,