of geometers and astronomers, and that either there is no distinction between truths and falsehoods in geometry and astronomy, or that, at any rate, we do not know which the true propositions are.  That there is a real distinction between true and false propositions and that, with pains and care, we can discover some truths are assumptions we must make if we are to recognize the possibility of pursuing knowledge at all, and there is no reason to suppose that these assumptions do not hold as good in matters of art and morals as elsewhere.  No doubt, in practice men are prone to mistake what they like for what is right or beautiful, but this danger, such as it is, is not confined to art and morals.  Men do often call acts right merely because they like doing them or pictures beautiful merely because they get pleasure from them.  But it is also notorious that many men are prone to believe that a thing is likely to happen merely because they wish it to happen, or that it is unlikely to happen merely because they wish it not to happen.  Yet no one seriously makes the reality of these tendencies a ground for denying the possibility of ‘inferring the future from the past’.  We must then, I hold, regard it as an integral part of the whole story of everything to find an answer to the questions What is good? and What is beautiful? as well as to the question What is fact?  By the side of the so-called ‘positive sciences’, which deal with the third question, we must recognize as having an equal right to exist the so-called ’sciences of value’, which deal with the first and the second.

I want now to take a further step in which disciples of Mr. Russell would perhaps decline to follow me.  We have already seen what is meant by the co-ordination of the sciences into a single body of deductions from definite ultimate postulates, though in what we have said about the task we were content to speak provisionally as if the sciences of ’what is’ were all the sciences to be co-ordinated.  We talked, in fact, as if the work of Philosophy were merely to work into a coherent story all that can be known of ’objects that present themselves to the contemplation’ of a knower.  But, of course, if Philosophy is ever to attack its final problem, we must take into account two things which we have so far ignored.  The ‘whole story of everything’ includes the knowing intelligence itself as well as the ‘objects’ which present themselves to its gaze.  Indeed, it is not even accurate to speak as if ‘objects’ ‘presented themselves’ to a merely passive intelligence; to be apprehended, they have to be actively attended to.  If we would see them, we have to be on the look-out for them.  And the knowing intelligence is not aware merely of these objects.  It is also aware of itself, though it is certainly never a ‘presented object’.  Also, it is not only a knower but a doer and a maker.  Intelligence is shown as much in the ordering of life by a rule based on a right valuation of goods and in the making of things