The study for officers is the art of war, specialising in Naval Strategy.

The true method of procedure then is to get hold of a general theory of war, and so ascertain the exact relations of Naval Strategy to the whole.

War is a form of political intercourse, a continuation of foreign politics which begins when force is introduced to attain our ends.

OBJECTS.

We seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be ulterior or immediate.

Immediate objects (also called “Primary”) are the ends of particular operations or movements.  But it must be remembered that every primary object has also its ulterior object; that is, every operation must be regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war.

Strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view.  Classified by the object it is Major Strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; Minor Strategy, with primary objects.

This also means that every operation of an army or fleet must be regarded in a double light, i.e., it must be planned and conducted in relation (1) to the general progress of the war; (2) to the object to which it is immediately directed.

Major Strategy (always regarding the ulterior object) has for its province the plan of the war, and includes:  (1) Selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; (2) Selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces.

NOTE.—­Major Strategy in its broadest sense has also to deal with the whole resources of the nation for war.  It is a branch of statesmanship.  It regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be handled together; they are instruments of war.  But it also has to keep in view constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), and its commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained).  The friction of these two considerations is inherent in war, and we call it the deflection of strategy by politics.  It is usually regarded as a disease.  It is really a vital factor in every strategical problem.  It may be taken as a general rule that no question of grand strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versa.  For a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice versa.  To decide a question of grand strategy without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only.  Neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate.  This interaction has to be accepted by commanding officers as part of the inevitable “friction of war.”  A good example is Pitt’s refusal to send a fleet into the Baltic to assist Frederick the Great during the Seven Years War, for fear of compromising our relations with the Scandinavian Powers.

Minor Strategy has for its province the plans of operations.  It deals with—­