the tyranny of De Robles, a young man of low origin and little ability.  It was even said that Alfonso de Hinojosa, from resentment against Gonzalo for superseding him in the government, had sent privately to offer his assistance to Centeno.  Both of these reports are highly probable; as otherwise it would have been a most inexcusable rashness in Centeno, to call it no worse, to have presumed upon attacking Cuzco with the small number of men he had collected; as, besides the inhabitants of the city, there were more than five hundred soldiers there and in the environs, while he had only forty ill armed men, most of whom had swords or daggers fastened to poles, instead of pikes or lances.

On learning the approach of Centeno, De Robles returned to Cuzco, where he made such preparations as seemed necessary; and, on hearing that Centeno was within a days march, he took the field with three hundred men, sending forwards Francisco de Aguira to procure intelligence.  This person was brother to one Peruchio de Aguira who had formerly been put to death by the lieutenant-general Carvajal, and was consequently a secret enemy to the insurgent party.  Instead therefore of executing the commission confided to him by De Robles, he went immediately to join Centeno, whom he informed of every thing that was going on at Cuzco and of the state of affairs in that city.  In the night before the festival of Corpus Christi of the year 1547, Centeno advanced toward the city of Cuzco, by a different road from that in which De Robles and his troops were posted; and, having turned one of his flanks, made an unexpected assault with great resolution, as resolved to conquer or die.  Completely surprised and thrown into confusion, the troops of De Robles were unable to get into any order for defence, and even in several instances turned their arms against each other, insomuch that a good many of them were slain by their own comrades.  On this occasion Centeno used the following stratagem, which succeeded admirably:  Having taken off the saddles and bridles from the horses belonging to his small band of followers, he ordered them to be driven by his attendant Indians along the road which led to the front of the enemies camp, to call off their attention from his real attack on their flank and rear.  By this means, as the horses were urged on by the Indians behind, they threw the troops of De Robles into confusion, and enabled Centeno to penetrate into the camp unperceived and unopposed, where he and his men exerted themselves so courageously that the insurgents were completely defeated and put to flight.

[Illustration:  Map:  VICEROYALTY OF PERU]

By this successful exploit Centeno acquired great honour; it having been seldom seen that so small a number had defeated so disproportioned a force of infinitely better armed troops.  It has been reported that, on this occasion, some men belonging to Alfonso de Hinojosa were the first to fly, in consequence of secret orders for that purpose:  But these men never acknowledged the truth of this allegation, as disgraceful to themselves; and Centeno denied the story, as detracting from the glory of his victory.