Sec.102. Reprehensio est ... satis esse vobis:  Bait. follows Madv. in placing a comma after est, and a full stop at probabilia. Tamen ought in that case to follow dicimus, and it is noteworthy that in his communication to Halm (printed on p. 854 of Bait., and Hahn’s ed. of the philosophical works, 1861) Madv. omits the word tamen altogether, nor does Bait. in adopting the suggestion notice the omission. Ista diceret:  “stated the opinions you asked for.” Poetam:  this both Halm and Bait. treat as a gloss.

Sec.103.  For this section cf.  Lucullus’ speech, passim, and Sext. P.H. I. 227 sq. Academia ... quibus:  a number of exx. of this change from sing. to plural are given by Madv. on D.F. V. 16. Nullum:  on the favourite Ciceronian use of nullus for non see 47, 141, and Madv. Gram. 455, obs. 5. Illud sit disputatum:  for the construction cf. 98; autem is omitted with the same constr. in D.F. V. 79, 80. Nusquam alibi:  cf. 50.

Sec.104. Exposuisset adiungit:  Madv. on D.F. III. 67 notices a certain looseness in the use of tenses, which Cic. displays in narrating the opinions of philosophers, but no ex. so strong as this is produced. Ut aut approbet quid aut improbet:  this Halm rejects.  I have noticed among recent editors of Cic. a strong tendency to reject explanatory clauses introduced by ut.  Halm brackets a similar clause in 20, and is followed in both instances by Bait.  Kayser, who is perhaps the most extensive bracketer of modern times, rejects very many clauses of the kind in the Oratorical works.  In our passage, the difficulty vanishes when we reflect that approbare and improbare may mean either to render an absolute approval or disapproval, or to render an approval or disapproval merely based on probability.  For example, in 29 the words have the first meaning, in 66 the second.  The same is the case with nego and aio.  I trace the whole difficulty of the passage to the absence of terms to express distinctly the difference between the two kinds of assent.  The general sense will be as follows.  “There are two kinds of [Greek:  epoche], one which prevents a man from expressing any assent or disagreement (in either of the two senses above noticed), another which does not prevent him from giving an answer to questions, provided his answer be not taken to imply absolute approval or absolute disapproval; the result of which will be that he will neither absolutely deny nor absolutely affirm anything, but will merely give a qualified ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ dependent on probability.”  My defence of the clause impugned is substantially the same as that of Hermann in the Philologus (vol.  VII.), which I had not read when this note was first written. Alterum placere ... alterum tenere:  “the one is his formal dogma, the other is his actual practice.”