logos], which terms are of frequent occurrence. Rationibus progredi:  to a similar question Sextus answers, [Greek:  ouk estin anankaion tas ekeinon] (the dogmatists) [Greek:  dogmatologias probainein, plasmatodeis hyparchousas] (Adv.  Math. VIII. 367). Sapientiae ... futurum est:  for the dat. with facio and fio see Madv. Gram. 241, obs. 5, Opusc. I. 370, D.F. II. 79, and cf. 96 of this book. Lex veri rectique:  cf. 29; the constitutio veri and the determination of what is rectum in morals are the two main tasks of philosophy. Sapientique satis non sit:  so Manut. for the sapientisque sit of the MSS.  Halm after Dav. reads sapientis, neque satis sit, which I think is wrong, for if the ellipse be supplied the construction will run neque dubitari potest quin satis sit, which gives the exact opposite of the sense required. Ratum:  cf. 141.

Sec.28. Perceptum:  thoroughly known and grasped.  Similar arguments are very frequent in Sextus, e.g. Adv.  Math. VIII. 281, where the dogmatist argues that if proof be impossible, as the sceptic says, there must be a proof to show it impossible; the sceptic doctrine must be provable.  Cf. 109 of this book. Postulanti:  making it a necessity for the discussion; cf. De Leg. I. 21. Consentaneum esse:  [Greek:  akolouthon einai]. Ut alia:  although others. Tantum abest ut—­ut:  cf.  Madv. Gram. 440 a.

Sec.29. Pressius:  cf. De Fato 31, 33, N.D. II. 20, T.D. IV. 14, Hortensius fragm. 46 ed.  Nobbe.  The word is mocked in 109. Decretum:  of course the Academics would say they did not hold this [Greek:  dogma] as stabile fixum ratum but only as probabile.  Sextus however Pyrrh.  Hyp. I. 226 (and elsewhere) accuses them of making it in reality what in words they professed it not to be, a fixed dogma. Sentitis enim:  cf. sentis in D.F. III. 26. Fluctuare:  “to be at sea,” Halm fluctuari, but the deponent verb is not elsewhere found in Cic. Summa:  cf. summa philosophiae D.F. II. 86. Veri falsi:  cf. n. on 92. Quae visa:  so Halm for MSS. quaevis, which edd. had changed to quae a quovis. Repudiari:  the selection depended on the probabile of course, with the Academics. Veri falsique:  these words were used in different senses by the dogmatist and the sceptic, the former meant by them “the undestructibly true and false.”  This being so, the statements in the text are in no sense arguments, they are mere assertions, as Sext. says, [Greek:  psile phasei ison pheretai psile phasis] (A.M. VII. 315), [Greek:  phasei men phasis epischethesetai] (ib. 337). Cognoscendi initium:  cf. 26, “This I have,” the Academic would reply, “in my probabile.” Extremum expetendi: