eum ... et inter:  for the repetition of inter cf. T.D. IV. 32 and Madv. Gram. 470. Nihil interesse:  if the doctrine of the Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when he fancied himself in pleasure, and vice versa; thus the distinction between pleasure and pain would be obscured. Sentiet ... insaniat:  For the sequence cf. D.F. I. 62 and Wesenberg’s fine note on T.D. V. 102.

Sec.21. Illud est album:  these are [Greek:  axiomata], judgments of the mind, in which alone truth and falsehood reside; see Zeller 107 sq.  There is a passage in Sext. Adv.  Math. VII. 344, 345 which closely resembles ours; it is too long to quote entire:  [Greek:  aisthesesi men oun monais labein talethes] (which resides only in the [Greek:  axioma]) [Greek:  ou dynatai anthropos. ... physei gar eisin alogoi ... dei de eis phantasian achthenai tou toioutou pragmatos “touto leukon esti kai touto glyky estin.” toi de toioutoi pragmati ouketi tes aistheseos ergon estin epiballein ... syneseos te dei kai mnemes]. Ille deinceps:  deinceps is really out of place; cf. 24 quomodo primum for pr. quom. Ille equus est:  Cic. seems to consider that the [Greek:  axioma], which affirms the existence of an abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the existence of a concrete individual.  I can quote no parallel to this from the Greek texts. Expletam comprehensionem:  full knowledge.  Here we rise to a definition.  This one often appears in Sextus:  e.g. Adv.  Math. VII. [Greek:  anthropos esti zoon logikon thneton, nou kai epistemes dektikon].  The Stoic [Greek:  horoi], and this among them, are amusingly ridiculed, Pyrrh.  Hyp. II. 208—­211. Notitiae:  this Cic. uses as a translation both of [Greek:  prolepsis] and [Greek:  ennoia], for which see Zeller 79, 89.  In I. 40 notiones rerum is given. Sine quibus:  [Greek:  dia gar ton ennoion ta pragmata lambanetai] Diog.  VII. 42.

Sec.22. Igitur:  for the anacoluthia cf.  Madv. Gram. 480. Consentaneum:  so Sextus constantly uses [Greek:  akolouthon]. Repugnaret:  cf.  I. 19 and n. Memoriae certe:  n. on 106. Continet:  cf. contineant in 40. Quae potest esse:  Cic. nearly always writes putat esse, potest esse and the like, not esse putat etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a clause. Memoria falsorum:  this difficulty is discussed in Plato Sophist. 238—­239. Ex multis animi perceptionibus:  the same definition of an art occurs in N.D. II. 148, D.F. III. 18 (see Madv.), Quint, II. 17, 41, Sext. Pyrrh.  Hyp. III. 188 [Greek:  technen einai systema ek katalepseon syngegymnasmenon] ib. III. 250. Quam:  for the change from plural to singular (perceptio in universum) cf. n. on I. 38, Madv. D.F. II. 61, Em. 139. Qui distingues: