It has been said that, before sailing to Arica, I had procured from General San Martin discretionary powers to do as I pleased with the troops placed at my disposal.  My object was believed to be to create a diversion in favour of the general, but this was the least part of my intention; for, as the army had remained inactive from its first landing in Peru—­with the exception of the detachment under Colonel Arenales,—­no diversion would have been of much use.  I wrote to the Government at Santiago for 1,000 men, or, if these could not be sent, for 500, and also for 1,000 stand of arms, of which there was abundance in the arsenal to equip recruits, who would have been forthcoming; and with these we could, with the greatest ease, have secured the whole of the southern provinces of Peru, the people being warmly disposed in our favour.  I therefore told the Government that with such a force, we could hold the whole of Lower Peru, and gain eventual possession of Upper Peru.  My request was refused, on the false ground that the Government had no means to equip such an expedition, and thus the good will manifested by the natives was thrown away.

In spite of this neglect, I determined to persevere, relying upon sacrifices made by the Peruvians themselves in our favour.  General Ramirez was actively engaged in drawing men from distant garrisons to act against our small force, which was suffering severely from ague.  Nevertheless, every effort was made again to advance into the interior—­a number of recruits from the adjacent provinces having been enrolled—­and everything promised a general revolt in favour of independence, when the Governor of Arequipa communicated to us intelligence that an armistice had been agreed upon for twenty days, between General San Martin and the Viceroy Lacerna.  This happening just at the moment when hostilities could have been carried on with the greatest effect, and we were preparing to attack Arequipa itself—­was annoying in the extreme; the more so, as the application had come from the Viceroy, who, being the first to receive intelligence of our success, had, no doubt, deceived General San Martin into the arrangement, in order to check our operations in the South.

This armistice was ratified on the 23rd of May, and sent by express to the Governor of Arequipa, the unusual haste proving the object of the Viceroy in persuading General San Martin to its ratification.  To have regarded the armistice as a preliminary to the independence of Peru was a great mistake on the part of General San Martin, as the Viceroy Lacerna had no more power to acknowledge the absolute independence of the Colonists, than had his predecessor; and therefore the object of the armistice could have been none other than to put a stop to our progress, thereby giving the Spanish generals time to collect their scattered forces, without any corresponding advantage to the patriot cause.