great properties were ruining Italy[16]—­a sure proof, when the great division of estates in the days of the Republic—­when, literally speaking, “every rood had its man”—­that some general and irresistible cause, affecting the remuneration of their industry, was exterminating the small proprietors.  Erelong, cultivators ceased entirely in the country, and the huge estates of the nobles were cultivated exclusively in pasturage, and by means of slaves.  “La classe,” says Michelet, “des petits cultivateurs peu a pee a disparu; les grands proprietaires qui leur succederent y suppleerent par des esclaves."[17] It is recorded by Ammianus Marcellinus, that when Rome was taken by the Goths, it contained 1,200,000 inhabitants, and was mainly supported by 1780 great families, who cultivated their ample estates in Italy in pasturage, by means of slaves.[18] For centuries before, the threat of blockading the Tiber had been found to be the most effectual way of coercing the Roman populace; and whenever it took place, famine ensued, not only in Rome, but the Italian provinces.  The diminution of its agricultural produce had, long before, been stated by Columella at nine-tenths, and by Varro at three-fourths, of what at one period had been raised.  Yet such was the wealth of the Roman nobles, derived from pasturage, that some of them had L.160, 000 a-year.[19] Agriculture, therefore, was destroyed; grain was no longer raised in Italy; Rome was wholly dependent on foreign supplies—­but pasturage was undecayed; and colossal fortunes were enjoyed by a wealthy race of great proprietors, who managed their vast estates by means of slaves, and had bought up and absorbed the properties of the whole free cultivators in the country.  Such was the effect—­such was the result—­of a free trade in grain in ancient times.

    [16] “Verumque confitentibus latifundia perdidere Italiam.”—­PLINY,
    Hist.  Nat.xviii. 7.

    [17] MICHELET, i. 96.

    [18] AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS, c. xvi.—­See also GIBBON, vi. 264.

    [19] GIBBON, vi. 262.

The free traders seem not insensible to these inevitable results of their favourite principles; but they meet them by describing such consequences as rather advantageous than injurious.  If England, say they, can raise iron and cotton goods cheaper than Poland, and Poland and Russia grain cheaper than England, then the interest of each require that they should follow out these branches of industry, and it is impolitic to strive against it.  Let, then, England admit foreign grain on a nominal duty, and this will in the end induce Russia and Prussia to admit English manufactured goods on equally favourable terms; and thus the real interests of both countries will in the end be promoted.

There are two objections to this system.  In the first place, it is impracticable if it were expedient.  In the second, it is inexpedient if it were practicable.