I suggest that the difference of opinion, reduced to its lowest terms, is no other than the difference between the men who think slavery a wrong and those who do not think it wrong.  The Republican party think it wrong—­we think it is a moral, a social, and a political wrong.  We think it is a wrong not confining itself merely to the persons or the States where it exists, but that it is a wrong which in its tendency, to say the least, affects the existence of the whole nation.  Because we think it wrong, we propose a course of policy that shall deal with it as a wrong.

We deal with it as with any other wrong, in so far as we can prevent its growing any larger, and so deal with it that in the run of time there may be some promise of an end to it We have a due regard to the actual presence of it amongst us, and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way, and all the constitutional obligations thrown about it.  I suppose that in reference both to its actual existence in the nation, and to our constitutional obligations, we have no right at all to disturb it in the States where it exists, and we profess that we have no more inclination to disturb it than we have the right to do it.  We go further than that:  we don’t propose to disturb it where, in one instance, we think the Constitution would permit us.  We think the Constitution would permit us to disturb it in the District of Columbia.  Still we do not propose to do that, unless it should be in terms which I don’t suppose the nation is very likely soon to agree to—­the terms of making the emancipation gradual and compensating the unwilling owners.  Where we suppose we have the constitutional right, we restrain ourselves in reference to the actual existence of the institution and the difficulties thrown about it.  We also oppose it as an evil so far as it seeks to spread itself.  We insist on the policy that shall restrict it to its present limits.  We don’t suppose that in doing this we violate anything due to the actual presence of the institution, or anything due to the constitutional guaranties thrown around it.

We oppose the Dred Scott decision in a certain way, upon which I ought perhaps to address you in a few words.  We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by the court, we, as a mob, will decide him to be free.  We do not propose that, when any other one, or one thousand, shall be decided by that court to be slaves, we will in any violent way disturb the rights of property thus settled; but we nevertheless do oppose that decision as a political rule, which shall be binding on the voter to vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favour no measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision.  We do not propose to be bound by it as a political rule in that way, because we think it lays the foundation not merely of enlarging and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation for spreading that evil into the States themselves.  We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject.