the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is
in the course of ultimate extinction; or, on the other
hand, that its advocates will push it forward until
it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old
as well as new, North as well as South. Now, I
believe if we could arrest the spread, and place it
where Washington and Jefferson and Madison placed
it, it would be in the course of ultimate extinction,
and the public mind would, as for eighty years past,
believe that it was in the course of ultimate extinction.
The crisis would be past, and the institution might
be let alone for a hundred years—if it should
live so long—in the States where it exists,
yet it would be going out of existence in the way
best for both the black and the white races. [A voice:
“Then do you repudiate popular sovereignty?”]
Well, then, let us talk about popular sovereignty.
What is popular sovereignty? Is it the right
of the people to have slavery or not to have it, as
they see fit, in the Territories? I will state—and
I have an able man to watch me—my understanding
is that popular sovereignty, as now applied to the
question of slavery, does allow the people of a Territory
to have slavery if they want to, but does not allow
them not to have it if they do not want it. I
do not mean that if this vast concourse of people were
in a Territory of the United States, any one of them
would be obliged to have a slave if he did not want
one; but I do say that, as I understand the Dred Scott
decision, if any one man wants slaves, all the rest
have no way of keeping that one man from holding them.
When I made my speech at Springfield, of which the
Judge complains, and from which he quotes, I really
was not thinking of the things which he ascribes to
me at all. I had no thought in the world that
I was doing anything to bring about a war between
the free and slave States. I had no thought in
the world that I was doing anything to bring about
a political and social equality of the black and white
races. It never occurred to me that I was doing
anything or favouring anything to reduce to a dead
uniformity all the local institutions of the various
States. But I must say, in all fairness to him,
if he thinks I am doing something which leads to these
bad results, it is none the better that I did not
mean it. It is just as fatal to the country, if
I have any influence in producing it, whether I intend
it or not. But can it be true that placing this
institution upon the original basis—the
basis upon which our fathers placed it—can
have any tendency to set the Northern and the Southern
States at war with one another, or that it can have
any tendency to make the people of Vermont raise sugar-cane,
because they raise it in Louisiana, or that it can
compel the people of Illinois to cut pine logs on
the Grand Prairie, where they will not grow, because
they cut pine logs in Maine, where they do grow?
The Judge says this is a new principle started in
regard to this question. Does the Judge claim