had been able to get through the enemies’ lines on the 19th, stating that the Germans were making their way in on Metz, but that he (Bazaine) hoped to break away towards Montmedy and so join MacMahon’s army. (This, it will be observed, was after Gravelotte had been lost.) Napoleon III. thereupon replied:  “Received yours of the 19th at Reims; am going towards Montmedy; shall be on the Aisne the day after to-morrow, and there will act according to circumstances to come to your aid.”  Bazaine did not receive this message until August 30, and then made only two weak efforts to break out on the north (August 31-September 1).  The Marshal’s action in sending that message must be pronounced one of the most fatal in the whole war.  It led the Emperor and MacMahon to a false belief as to the position at Metz, and furnished a potent argument to the Empress and Palikao at Paris to urge a march towards Montmedy at all costs.

Doubtfully MacMahon led his straggling array from Reims in a north-easterly direction towards Stenay on the Meuse.  Rain checked his progress, and dispirited the troops; but on the 27th August, while about half-way between the Aisne and the Meuse, his outposts touched those of the enemy.  They were, in fact, those of the Prussian Crown Prince, whose army was about to cross the northern roads over the Argonne, the line of hills that saw the French stem the Prussian invasion in 1792.  Far different was the state of affairs now.  National enthusiasm, organisation, enterprise—­all were on the side of the invaders.  As has been pointed out, their horsemen found out on the 23rd that the Chalons camp was deserted; on the next day their scouts found out from a Parisian newspaper that MacMahon was at Reims; and, on the day following, newspaper tidings that had come round by way of London revealed the secret that MacMahon was striving to reach Bazaine.

How it came about that this news escaped the eye of the censor has not been explained.  If it was the work of an English journalist, that does not absolve the official censorship from the charge of gross carelessness in leaving even a loophole for the transmission of important secrets.  Newspaper correspondents, of course, are the natural enemies of Governments in time of war; and the experience of the year 1870 shows that the fate of Empires may depend on the efficacy of the arrangements for controlling them.  As a proof of the superiority of the German organisation, or of the higher patriotism of their newspapers, we may mention that no tidings of urgent importance leaked out through the German Press.  This may have been due to a solemn declaration made by German newspaper editors and correspondents that they would never reveal such secrets; but, from what we know of the fierce competition of newspapers for priority of news, it is reasonable to suppose that the German Government took very good care that none came in their way.