same ambassador presented a note from his Government demanding the right to march its troops into Belgium in order to prevent a similar measure by the French.  On the morrow Belgium protested against this act, and denied the rumour as to French action.  King Albert also telegraphed to King George asking for the help of the United Kingdom.  The tidings reached the British Cabinet after it had been carefully considering whether German aggression on Belgium would not constitute a casus belli[559].

[Footnote 559:  British White Paper, Nos. 123, 151, 153; Belgian Grey Book, Nos. 20-25.  For a full and convincing refutation of the German charges that our military attaches at Brussels in 1906 and 1912 had bound us by conventions(!) to land an army in Belgium, see second Belgian Grey Book, pp. 103-6; Headlam, op. cit., ch. xvi., also p. 377, on the charge that France was about to invade Belgium.]

The news of the German demand and the King’s appeal reached Westminster just before the first debate on August 3.  Sir Edward Grey stated that we were not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance, of which we did not know the exact terms; and there was no binding compact with France; but the conversations on naval affairs pledged us to consult her with a view to preventing an unprovoked attack by the German navy.  He explained his conditional promise to M. Cambon.  Thereupon Mr. Redmond promised the enthusiastic support of all Irishmen.  Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, though demurring to the policy of Sir Edward Grey, said, “If the Right Honourable gentleman could come to us and tell us that a small European nationality like Belgium is in danger, and could assure us that he is going to confine the conflict to that question, then we would support him.”  Now, the Cabinet had by this time resolved that the independence of Belgium should be a test question, as it was in 1870.  Therefore, there seemed the hope that not only the Irish but all the Labour party would give united support to the Government.  By the evening debate official information had arrived; and, apart from some cavilling criticisms, Parliament was overwhelmingly in favour of decided action on behalf of Belgium.  Sir Edward Grey despatched to Berlin an ultimatum demanding the due recognition of Belgian neutrality by Germany.  No answer being sent, Great Britain and Germany entered on a state of war shortly before midnight of August 4.

The more fully the facts are known, the clearer appears the aggressive character of German policy.  Some of her Ministers doubted the advisability of war, and hoped to compass their ends by threats as in 1909 and 1913; but they were overborne by the bellicose party on or shortly before July 29.  Whether the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, or the General Staff is most to blame, it is idle to speculate; but German diplomacy at the crisis shows every sign of having been forced on by military men.  Bethmann-Hollweg was never remarkable for breadth of view and clearness of insight; yet he alone could scarcely have perpetrated the follies which alienated Italy and outraged the sentiments of the civilised world in order to gain a few days’ start over France and stab her unguarded side.  It is a clumsy imitation of the policy of Frederick in 1756.