[Footnote 404:  Sir C.W.  Wilson, From Korti to Khartum, pp. 28-35; also see Hon. R. Talbot’s article on “Abu Klea,” in the Nineteenth Century for January 1886.]

Two days later, while the force was beating off an attack of the Arabs near Metammeh, General Stewart received a wound which proved to be mortal.  The command now devolved on Sir Charles Wilson of the Royal Engineers.  After repelling the attacks of other Mahdists and making good his position on the Nile, the new commander came into touch with Gordon’s steamers, which arrived there on the 21st, with 190 Sudanese.  Again, however, the advance of other Arabs from Omdurman caused a delay until a fortified camp or zariba could be formed.  Wilson now had but 1322 unwounded men; and he saw that the Mahdists were in far greater force than Lord Wolseley or General Gordon had expected.  Not until January 24 could the commander steam away southwards with 20 men of the Sussex regiment and the 190 Sudanese soldiers on the two largest of Gordon’s boats—­his “penny steamers” as he whimsically termed them.

The sequel is well known.  After overcoming many difficulties caused by rocks and sandbanks, after running the gauntlet of the Mahdist fire, this forlorn hope neared Khartum on the 28th, only to find that the place had fallen.  There was nothing for it but to put about and escape while it was possible.  Sir Charles Wilson has described the scene:  “The masses of the enemy with their fluttering banners near Khartum, the long rows of riflemen in the shelter-trenches at Omdurman, the numerous groups of men on Tuti [Island], the bursting of shells, and the water torn up by hundreds of bullets, and occasionally heavier shot, made an impression never to be forgotten.  Looking out over the stormy scene, it seemed almost impossible that we should escape[405].”

[Footnote 405:  Sir C.W.  Wilson, op. cit. pp. 176-177.]

Weighed down by grief at the sad failure of all their strivings, the little band yet succeeded in escaping to Metammeh.  They afterwards found out that they were two days too late.  The final cause of the fall of Khartum is not fully known.  The notion first current, that it was due to treachery, has been discredited.  Certainly the defenders were weakened by privation and cowed by the Mahdist successes.  The final attack was also given at a weak place in the long line of defence; but whether the defenders all did their best, or were anxious to make terms with the Mahdi, will probably never be known.  The conduct of the assailants in at once firing on the relieving force forbids the notion that they all along intended to get into Khartum by treachery just before the approach of the steamers.  Had that been their aim, they would surely have added one crowning touch of guile, that of remaining quiet until Wilson and his men landed at Khartum.  The capture of the town would therefore seem to be due to force, not to treachery.