declared to me in the clearest way that so long as he was Minister we need not fear that our sailors and our soldiers would be sent to Japan.  My own opinion is that this folly is not to be apprehended under any Ministry. (The Times.  February 3.)

At present, then, everything tends to show that the Franco-Russian alliance refers solely to European questions and is merely a defensive agreement in view of a possible attack from one or more members of the Triple Alliance.  Seeing that the purely defensive character of the latter has always been emphasised, doubts are very naturally expressed in many quarters as to the use of these alliances.  The only tangible advantage gained by any one of the five Powers is that Russia has had greater facilities for raising loans in France and in securing her hold on Manchuria.  On the other hand, Frenchmen complain that the alliance has entailed an immense financial responsibility, which is dearly bought by the cessation of those irritating frontier incidents of the Schnaebele type which they had to put up with from Bismarck in the days of their isolation[275].

[Footnote 275:  See an article by Jules Simon in the Contemporary Review, May 1894.]

Italy also questions the wisdom of her alliance with the Central Powers which brings no obvious return except in the form of slightly enhanced consideration from her Latin sister.  In cultured circles on both sides of the Maritime Alps there is a strong feeling that the present international situation violates racial instincts and tradition; and, as we have already seen, Italy’s attitude towards France is far different now from what it was in 1882.  It is now practically certain that Italians would not allow the King’s Government to fight France in the interests of the Central Powers.  Their feelings are quite natural.  What have Italians in common with Austrians and Prussians?  Little more, we may reply, than French republicans with the subjects of the Czar.  In truth both of these alliances rest, not on whole-hearted regard or affection, but on fear and on the compulsion which it exerts.

To this fact we may, perhaps, largely attribute the malaise of Europe.  The Greek philosopher Empedocles looked on the world as the product of two all-pervading forces, love and hate, acting on blind matter:  love brought cognate particles together and held them in union; hate or repulsion kept asunder the unlike or hostile elements.  We may use the terms of this old cosmogony in reference to existing political conditions, and assert that these two elemental principles have drawn Europe apart into two hostile masses; with this difference, that the allies for the most part are held together, not so much by mutual regard as by hatred of their opposites.  From this somewhat sweeping statement we must mark off one exception.  There were two allies who came together with the ease which betokens a certain amount of affinity.  Thanks to the statesmanlike moderation