[Footnote 258:  Seignobos, A Political History of Contemporary Europe, vol. i. p. 210 (Eng.  Ed.).]

The resignation of Gambetta having slackened the tension between Germany and France, Bismarck displayed less desire for the alliance of Italy.  Latterly, as a move in the German parliamentary game, he had coquetted with the Vatican; and as a result of this off-hand behaviour, Italy was slow in coming to accord with the Central Powers.  Nevertheless, her resentment respecting Tunis overcame her annoyance at Bismarck’s procedure; and on May 20, 1882, treaties were signed which bound Italy to the Central Powers for a term of five years.  Their conditions have not been published, but there are good grounds for thinking that the three allies reciprocally guaranteed the possession of their present territories, agreed to resist attack on the lands of any one of them, and stipulated the amount of aid to be rendered by each in case of hostilities with France or Russia, or both Powers combined.  Subsequent events would seem to show that the Roman Government gained from its northern allies no guarantee whatever for its colonial policy, or for the maintenance of the balance of power in the Mediterranean[259].

[Footnote 259:  For the Triple Alliance see the Rev. des deux Mondes, May 1, 1883; also Chiala, Storia contemporanea—­La Triplice e la Duplice Alleanza (1898).]

Very many Italians have sharply questioned the value of the Triple Alliance to their country.  Probably, when the truth comes fully to light, it will be found that the King and his Ministers needed some solid guarantee against the schemes of the Vatican to drive the monarchy from Rome.  The relations between the Vatican and the Quirinal were very strained in the year 1882; and the alliance of Italy with Austria removed all fear of the Hapsburgs acting on behalf of the Jesuits and other clerical intriguers.  The annoyance with which the clerical party in Italy received the news of the alliance shows that it must have interfered with their schemes.  Another explanation is that Italy actually feared an attack from France in 1882 and sought protection from the Central Powers.  We may add that on the renewal of the Triple Alliance in 1891, Italy pledged herself to send two corps through Tyrol to fight the French on their eastern frontier if they attacked Germany.  But it is said that that clause was omitted from the treaty on its last renewal, in 1902.

The accession of Italy to the Austro-German Alliance gave pause to Russia.  The troubles with the Nihilists also indisposed Alexander III. from attempting any rash adventures, especially in concert with a democratic Republic which changed its Ministers every few months.  His hatred of the Republic as the symbol of democracy equalled his distrust of it as a political kaleidoscope; and more than once he rejected the idea of a rapprochement to the western Proteus because of “the absence of any personage authorised to assume the responsibility for a treaty of alliance[260].”  These were the considerations, doubtless, which led him to dismiss the warlike Ignatieff, and to entrust the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to a hard-headed diplomatist, de Giers (June 12, 1882).  His policy was peaceful and decidedly opposed to the Slavophil propaganda of Katkoff, who now for a time lost favour.