" 11th. Paying his Lordship’s bills.
" 12th. Paying his Lordship’s bills.
" 17th. Received my last
three months’ pay to the 30th of
April.
" 18th. Received the remaining money from the Treasury.
" 19th. Sailed in the Piranga.
" 20th. Sent sixty dollars by pilot to two soldiers on shore.
June 6th. Captain Crosbie
appointed Captain of the Fleet, with
rank of Chief of Division.
July 2nd. At Portsmouth.
Agent arrived from London with
two months’ pay.
" 4th. Paying prize-money
to men who had not been paid.
Received two months’ pay to
the 1st instant.
" 11th. Paid John Skirr L.10 for wounds.
The amount paid by the Junta was, in fact, 105,800 dollars, partly in bills, from which a discount of 1800 dollars had to be taken. But these trifles are unworthy of notice: I have thus accounted for every shilling received from the Brazilian Government for the use of the squadron—to the satisfaction of my own conscience, and, I trust, to the satisfaction of all who may read this narrative.
From what has been herein stated, it is obvious that Brazil was, by my instrumentality—though with inadequate means—entirely freed from a foreign yoke, not only without national cost, but with positive gain, arising from the vast territories and revenues annexed—as well as from prizes, the value of which alone exceeded the cost of all naval equipments. It is true that, after a lapse of thirty-five years, a profession is made of adjudicating these prizes—but as nearly all the claimants are dead, and as an intention is manifested to retain my share, unless I produce accounts already transmitted—Brazil will have thus monopolized the fruits of our exertions in the cause of independence—achieved without trouble or thought to the Imperial Government. For, beyond the usual orders on the departure of the squadron, not a single instruction was given—all being left to my discretion, and accomplished on my sole responsibility. Even the favourable contraction of a loan in England—the acknowledgment of Brazilian independence by European states—and the establishment of permanent peace—were the direct consequences of my services, but for which Brazil might still have presented the same lamentable specimen of weakness without, and anarchy within, which forms the characteristics of other South American states.
Can any government then justify the conduct pursued towards me by Brazil? Can any government believe that the promises held out to me as an inducement to accept the command—may be optionally evaded after the more than completion of my part of the contract? The services rendered were fully acknowledged by those with whom that contract was made, and only repudiated by their factions successors, to whom Brazil owed nothing but prospective confusion.


