Looking back to the history of its introduction, we have seen that it was only in proportion as the deputies of the local communities were not regarded as delegates or agents that they became representatives.  Professor E. Jenks has written an interesting article in the Contemporary Review for December, 1898, in which he advances the theory that representation is a union of the ideas of agency, borrowed from the Roman law, and of vicarious liability from barbaric sources.  As to the latter he points out that in Anglo-Saxon times the only way for the King to control the free local communities was to exact hostages till crimes were punished or fines paid.  In England, where these ideas were combined, constitutional monarchy was firmly established; but in France, Germany, &c, in whose medieval parliaments the idea of agency prevailed, and where in consequence the parliamentary idea was weak, absolute monarchy held its ground.  When Edward I. desired for purposes of his own to emphasize the unlimited liability of political representatives, and insisted that they should have “full and sufficient power to do what of common council shall be ordained,” he probably never realized that a body having power to bind the shires and towns was a formidable institution, or that the trembling hostages would become in time haughty plenipotentiaries.  But whatever may have been the social conditions which gave rise to the idea, it is certain that it was the power of binding those to whom they owed their selection which enabled the representatives to resist the encroachments of the monarchy on the liberties of the people.  At first they were not legislators, but merely sought to uphold the ancient laws.  They presented petitions to redress their grievances; but in time these petitions became demands; and they refused to grant the King’s subsidies till the demands were complied with.  It was, therefore, this first stage of representation which enabled the people to start that long struggle against the power of the King and nobles which has ended in complete self-government; nay, more, it was necessary that they should pass through this first stage before they could learn to govern themselves.  Yet we have seen that if we apply the modern ideas on representation the start could never have been made.  In what respects, then, did these early representative institutions differ from the modern conception as a reproduction of the people on a small scale?  One obvious difference at once suggests itself.  The representatives were not average members of the communities; they were the most influential; they were selected because of their special fitness for the work to be done; they were leaders of the people, not followers; they did not take inspiration from the people, but brought it to them; and having selected these men the people deferred to their judgment to act for them and protect their interests.  Here, then, we arrive at the first principle involved in representation, which is leadership.