industrial, commercial and transportation workers in times of peace will best take care of the same problems in time of war.”  For, “wrapped up with the safety of this Republic are ideals of democracy, a heritage which the masses of the people received from our forefathers, who fought that liberty might live in this country—­a heritage that is to be maintained and handed down to each generation with undiminished power and usefulness.”

We quote at such length because this document gives the quintessence of the wise labor statesmanship which this crisis brought so clearly to light.  Turning away from the pacifism of the Socialist party, Samuel Gompers and his associates believed that victory over world militarism as well as over the forces of reaction at home depended on labor’s unequivocal support of the government.  And in reality, by placing the labor movement in the service of the war-making power of the nation they assured for it, for the time being at least, a degree of national prestige and a freedom to expand which could not have been conquered by many years of the most persistent agitation and strikes.

The War, thus, far from being a trial for organized labor, proved instead a great opportunity.  For the War released organized labor from a blind alley, as it were.  The American Federation of Labor, as we saw, had made but slow progress in organization after 1905.  At that time it had succeeded in organizing the skilled and some of the semi-skilled workers.  Further progress was impeded by the anti-union employers especially in industries commonly understood to be dominated by “trusts.”  In none of the “trustified” industries, save anthracite coal, was labor organization able to make any headway.  And yet the American Federation of Labor, situated as it is, is obliged to stake everything upon the power to organize.[86] The war gave it that all-important power.  Soon after the Federal government became the arbiter of industry—­by virtue of being the greatest consumer, and by virtue of a public opinion clearly outspoken on the subject—­we see the Taft-Walsh War Labor Board[87] embody “the right to organize” into a code of rules for the guidance of the relations of labor and capital during War-time, along with the basic eight-hour day and the right to a living wage.  In return for these gifts American labor gave up nothing so vital as British labor had done in the identical situation.  The right to strike was left unmolested and remained a permanent threat hanging over slow moving officialdom and recalcitrant employers.  And the only restraint accepted by labor was a promise of self-restraint.  The Federation was not to strike until all other means for settlement had been tried, nor was it to press for the closed shop where such had not existed prior to the War declaration.  But at the same time no employer was to interpose a check to its expansion into industries and districts heretofore unorganized.  Nor could an employer discipline an employe for joining a union or inducing others to join.