In brief, we were to stretch out our right arm, reach round the enemy’s flank, and pivoting on Hildyard’s Brigade crumple him from (his) left to right.  It was the same plan as before, only that we now had our right hand on the Monte Cristo ridge, from which commanding position our long-range guns could enfilade and even take in reverse some of the enemy’s trenches.

The leading brigade was across the river by nine o’clock, and by ten had reached its position ready for attacking at the foot of Barton’s Hill.  The advance began forthwith and the figures of the Infantry could be seen swarming up the steep slopes of the river gorge.  The Boers did very little to stop the attack.  They knew their weakness.  One side of Barton’s Hill was swept and commanded by the guns on Monte Cristo.  The other side, at the back of which was the donga we were ‘fanning,’ was raked by the heavy artillery on the Hlangwani spur and by the field batteries arranged along the south side of the river.  Observe the influence of the Monte Cristo ridge!  It made Barton’s Hill untenable by the Boers; and Barton’s Hill prepared the way for an attack on Railway Hill, and Railway Hill—­but I must not anticipate.  Indeed, next to Monte Cristo, Barton’s Hill was the key of the Boer position, and so unfortunate was the enemy’s situation that he could not hold this all-important feature once he had lost the Monte Cristo ridge.

What was tactically possible and safe—­for the Boer is a cautious warrior—­was done.  Knowing that his left would be turned he extended a sort of false left in the air beyond the end of the Monte Cristo ridge, and here he brought a gun into action, which worried us among other people but did not, of course, prevent any military movement.

By noon the whole of Barton’s Hill was in the possession of his brigade, without, as it seemed to us, any serious opposition.  The artillery then turned its attention to the other objectives of the attack.  The Boer detached left was, however, of considerable strength, and as soon as Barton had occupied this hill (which proved, moreover, far more extensive than had been expected), he was heavily attacked by rifle fire from its under features and from a network of dongas to the eastward, and as the Artillery were busy preparing the attack on Railway Hill, the brigade, particularly the Scots and Irish Fusiliers, soon became severely engaged and suffered grievous loss.

The fact that Barton’s Hill was in our possession made the Boers on Railway and Inniskilling Hills very insecure.  A powerful Infantry force was holding the left of their position, and though it was itself being actively attacked on the eastern face, it could spare at least a battalion to assail their flank and threaten their rear.  Covered by this flanking fire, by the long-range musketry, and by a tremendous bombardment, in which every gun, from the lumbering 5 in. siege guns to the little 9-pounder mountain battery, joined, the main attack was now launched.  It proceeded simultaneously against Railway Hill, Inniskilling Hill, and the neck between them, but as the general line was placed obliquely across the Boer front, the attack fell first on Railway Hill and the neck.