The question now arose—­Where should the river be crossed?  Sir Redvers Buller possessed the whole of the Hlangwani plateau, which, as the reader may perceive by looking at the map opposite p. 448, fills up the re-entrant angle made opposite Pieters by the Tugela after it leaves Colenso.  From this Hlangwani plateau he could either cross the river where it ran north and south or where it ran east and west.  Sir Redvers Buller determined to cross the former reach beyond Colenso village.  To do this he had to let go his hold on the Monte Cristo ridge and resign all the advantages which its possession had given him, and had besides to descend into the low ground, where his army must be cramped between the high hills on its left and the river on its right.

There was, of course, something to be said for the other plan, which was advocated strongly by Sir Charles Warren.  The crossing, it was urged, was absolutely safe, being commanded on all sides by our guns, and the enemy could make no opposition except with artillery.  Moreover, the army would get on its line of railway and could ‘advance along the railroad.’  This last was a purely imaginary advantage, to be sure, because the railway had no rolling-stock, and was disconnected from the rest of the line by the destruction of the Tugela bridge.  But what weighed with the Commander-in-Chief much more than the representations of his lieutenant was the accumulating evidence that the enemy were in full retreat.  The Intelligence reports all pointed to this situation.  Boers had ridden off in all directions.  Waggons were seen trekking along every road to the north and west.  The camps between us and Ladysmith began to break up.  Everyone said, ’This is the result of Lord Roberts’s advance:  the Boers find themselves now too weak to hold us off.  They have raised the siege.’

But this conclusion proved false in the sense that it was premature.  Undoubtedly the Boers had been reduced in strength by about 5,000 men, who had been sent into the Free State for its defence.  Until the Monte Cristo ridge was lost to them they deemed themselves quite strong enough to maintain the siege.  When, however, this position was captured, the situation was revolutionised.  They saw that we had found their flank, and thoroughly appreciated the significance and value of the long high wedge of ground, which cut right across the left of their positions, and seemed to stretch away almost to Bulwana Mountain.  They knew perfectly well that if we advanced by our right along the line of this ridge, which they called ‘the Bush Kop,’ supporting ourselves by it as a man might rest his hand on a balustrade, we could turn their Pieters position just as we had already turned their entrenchments at Colenso.

Therein lay the true reason of their retirement, and in attributing it either to Lord Roberts’s operations or to the beating we had given them on the 18th we made a mistake, which was not repaired until much blood had been shed.