The Boer covering army numbers at least 12,000 men, with perhaps a dozen excellent guns.  They hold along the line of the Tugela what is practically a continuous position of vast strength.  Their superior mobility, and the fact that they occupy the chord, while we must move along the arc of the circle, enables them to forefront us with nearly their whole force wherever an attack is aimed, however it may be disguised.  Therefore there is no way of avoiding a direct assault.  Now, according to Continental experience the attacking force should outnumber the defence by three to one.  Therefore Sir Redvers Buller should have 36,000 men.  Instead of this he has only 22,000.  Moreover, behind the first row of positions, which practically runs along the edge of an unbroken line of steep flat-topped hills, there is a second row standing back from the edge at no great distance.  Any attack on this second row the Artillery cannot support, because from the plain below they are too far off to find the Boer guns, and from the edge they are too close to the enemy’s riflemen.  The ground is too broken, in the opinion of many generals, for night operations.  Therefore the attacking Infantry of insufficient strength must face unaided the fire of cool, entrenched riflemen, armed with magazine weapons and using smokeless powder.

Nevertheless, so excellent is the quality of the Infantry that if the whole force were launched in attack it is not impossible that they would carry everything before them.  But after this first victory it will be necessary to push on and attack the Boers investing Ladysmith.  The line of communications must be kept open behind the relieving army or it will be itself in the most terrible danger.  Already the Boers’ position beyond Potgieter’s laps around us on three sides.  What if we should break through, only to have the door shut behind us?  At least two brigades would have to be left to hold the line of communications.  The rest, weakened by several fierce and bloody engagements, would not be strong enough to effect the relief.

The idea of setting all on the turn of the battle is very grateful and pleasant to the mind of the army, which only asks for a decisive trial of strength, but Sir Redvers Buller has to remember that his army, besides being the Ladysmith Relief Column, is also the only force which can be spared to protect South Natal.  Is he, therefore, justified in running the greatest risks?  On the other hand, how can we let Ladysmith and all its gallant defenders fall into the hands of the enemy?  It is agonising to contemplate such a conclusion to all the efforts and sacrifices that have been made.  I believe and trust we shall try again.  As long as there is fighting one does not reflect on this horrible situation.  I have tried to explain some of the difficulties which confront the General.  I am not now concerned with the attempts that have been made to overcome them.  A great deal is incomprehensible, but it may be safely said that if Sir Redvers Buller cannot relieve Ladysmith with his present force we do not know of any other officer in the British Service who would be likely to succeed.