their views.  So began a remarkable struggle in which the combined forces of the private members—­Liberal, Labour and Irish—­united by a common desire to destroy the domination of the Peers, contended against the Cabinet’s policy of attempting not merely to limit the power of veto but to reconstitute the Upper House.  In such a process men saw that the driving force of the majority would waste away and that the composite character of their alliance would lead to certain disruption.

Before the debate on the Address concluded it was plain that Redmond had won.  From that period onwards his popularity, and, through him, the popularity of the party which he led, was immensely increased in Great Britain.  He was regarded as one of the men who had rendered best service to democracy against privilege.  He himself believed that in this first contest Ireland had decided the victory—­had decided the overthrow of the House which had so long opposed its liberties.  Labour had then neither the essential leader nor the necessary parliamentary strength:  Liberalism was confused and uncertain at the critical moment.

Yet in the very process of achieving this success Redmond laid himself open to attack.  The Budget was regarded with dislike by a very large section of Irishmen, and apart from considerations of political strategy the Irish members would certainly have voted against it.  Now, the power was in their hands to defeat it finally.  By so doing they would, of course, justify to some degree the unconstitutional action of the Lords; but this consideration did not weigh with Mr. O’Brien and Mr. Healy.  They accused Redmond of selling the real interests of Ireland to keep a Government in office which could offer nothing in return but a gambling chance of limiting the veto of the Lords.  Mr. O’Brien was firmly confident that no such measure would ever pass.  He denounced the bargain, not merely because it was a bargain in which Redmond accepted what was in his view a ruinous injustice to Ireland, but because it was a bargain in which the Irish had been outwitted.  This line of argument was to be dinned into the ears of Ireland during all the remaining years of Redmond’s life.  The only conclusive answer to it was to gain Home Rule.  If, in the long run, it came to appear that the attackers had been right in their contention, and that Ireland had never received the expected return, the fault for that result lay with Ireland itself no less than with England; it most assuredly did not lie with John Redmond.  A great weight of responsibility rests on those who from the first hour of Ireland’s opportunity ingeminated distrust to an over-suspicious people.

For the moment, however, the attack made no headway.  Irishmen have a shrewd political sense, and they felt that in the struggle to pin Liberal Ministers to the true fighting objective Redmond had won.  They were also delighted to see the Irish party openly exert its power—­not quite realizing that such exhibitions were against the interest of the democratic alliance, which had to undergo a grave test.  The Government’s vacillation had rendered another general election necessary if the Veto question were to be fought out.